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Abstract
Source monitoring is the process of identifying and analyzing sources of information (Johnson et
al., 1993). The ability to monitor source improves with age which places children at a greater
risk for blending and misattributing information from different sources. Experiencing source
confusions has academic, legal, and social implications, and thus understanding how source
monitoring develops is important. Research exploring factors that impact source monitoring have
predominantly focused on maturational aspects such as at which ages children learn to monitor
source and neurological factors such as executive functioning. However, the impact of age and
executive functioning may vary across the type of sources presented, and thus the current study
sought to investigate other potential processes that may influence children’s ability to monitor
source. Emerging literature has illustrated the role of language on source-monitoring skills,
showing that linguistic structure may help to identify where information came from. Parents are
usually children’s most important linguistic partners and play a critical role in how children
remember past events, making the parental-interactional style an interesting process to examine
in children’s source monitoring. Consequently, the goal of this study was to assess the
association between mental-state talk in parent-child interactions and source monitoring. Using
mental-state talk scaffolds the ability to take on others’ perspectives and promotes an
understanding that people hold different representations of events which should help children to
reason about different knowledge states and sources of information. It was expected that mentalstate talk produced by mother-child dyads would be related to children’s recognition, source
accuracy, and source confusions. Children from aged 3 to 6 years old and their mothers (N = 33
dyads) participated in two online sessions. At the first session, the mother-child dyads engaged in
joint reminiscing about past events and read a wordless storybook together. Children’s receptive
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vocabulary (PPVT-4) was also assessed. For the source-monitoring measure, the dyads
collaboratively constructed a farm scene by taking turns moving pieces. Two to three days later
at the second session, children were asked recognition and source questions (e.g., who placed
which piece) about the farm activity from the first session. Parent-child joint reminiscing and
storytelling were transcribed and coded for the frequency of mother and child mental-state talk.
Mental-state talk produced by mother-child dyads in both reminiscing and storytelling were
related to children’s recognition, while only mother mental-state talk in reminiscing was related
to children’s source accuracy. Further, only the combined proportion of child and mother mentalstate talk in reminiscing was associated with children’s source errors. Together, the current
findings add to the growing literature on source monitoring by highlighting an important
parental-interactional style that may impact children’s ability to reason about multiple sources of
information. With these findings, implications for parenting and educational practices are
outlined and future directions are illustrated, including suggestions to increase sample size and
replicate this study with older age groups.
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Investigating the Use of Mental-State Talk in Parent-Child Joint Reminiscing and Storytelling on
Children’s Source Monitoring
Many tasks in our daily lives require recognizing sources of information such as when
recalling something learned in school or remembering a conversation with a friend. The source
or the origin of an event can refer to various details, including the spatial, temporal, and social
context under which a memory was acquired (Johnson et al., 1993). For example, when recalling
a research finding, one may use details such as the time of day, the weather, or clothing worn to
determine whether they learned this in their university lecture or they briefly read a social media
headline on the topic. Thus, the source might refer to details of where, when, or how an event
occurred or knowledge was acquired (Earhart & Roberts, 2014). While “source” are the
conditions under which this memory or information was acquired, source monitoring is the
process of identifying and analyzing these sources of information in terms of various contextual
details (Johnson et al., 1993). Source monitoring plays a critical role in our everyday lives such
as influencing our knowledge and belief development, our social relationships, and remembering
events of our own lives (Johnson et al., 1993; Roberts et al., 2016). Yet, monitoring our sources
is a difficult task because it requires us to separate real information (e.g., an actual conversation
you had with a friend) from misinformation (e.g., a conversation between two friends you
watched on T.V) that may both be stored in our memory. If we blend these sources together, the
source of the misinformation could be confused with the source of the original event leading to a
reduction in accuracy when recalling an event. That is, combining details from your actual
conversation and the conversation you watched on T.V when asked to recall the conversation
you had earlier with your friend (Pena et al., 2017).

MENTAL-STATE TALK AND SOURCE MONITORING

7

Given that one’s source-monitoring ability improves with age (Roberts, 2002), children
are even more susceptible to blending and misattributing information from different sources
compared to adults (Thierry, 2009). Source errors can lead to serious academic, legal, and social
consequences, which can put children at a greater risk of negative consequences. For example,
children might be especially vulnerable to confuse information from what they remember about
an original event (e.g., a sexual abuse instance), with events that occurred before or after this
event such as something they saw on T.V (Thierry et al., 2010). In the forensic arena, this
confusion of sources becomes problematic because perpetrators may not be charged for sexual
abuse if children cannot provide separate, accurate and detailed accounts of the original event
(Roberts, 2002). In education, source confusions may be problematic because students might not
develop a reliable and trustworthy knowledge base if they cannot separate their sources of
accurate and misinformation. Due to these negative implications that come with making source
errors, understanding how source monitoring develops, and what mechanisms play a role is
important. Some studies have highlighted the cognitive processes that contribute to source
monitoring (Earhart & Roberts, 2014; Hala et al., 2016), as well as the impact of mental-state
understanding (Welch-Ross, 2000). The role of language has also been identified as an emerging
factor impacting source accuracy, suggesting that linguistic structure may also contribute to this
development (Ögel-Balaban et al., 2012).
Little research has highlighted the role of parental interactional styles on children’s
source-monitoring development. However, with new research highlighting the role of language,
investigating parents’ influence warrants attention. Parents are often children’s first and main
linguistic partners and play a key role in how children remember past events (Reese et al., 2020).
The type of language used in these interactions may foster metacognitive skills (Rudek & Haden,
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2005). For instance, there are associations between mental-state understanding and source
monitoring (Welch-Ross, 2000), and therefore the use of mental-state talk during parent-child
interactions might foster the underlying mechanisms necessary for source monitoring. As such,
investigating parent-child interactions may reveal critical aspects of language that are related to
children’s ability to monitor source. Also, expanding the examination of parents’ role on source
monitoring may help develop better parenting practices regarding how children process different
sources of information (Evans & Roberts, 2009; Shin et al., 2020). For example, through
reflecting on the way they discuss past events with their children and by understanding that
children experience difficulty with monitoring source, parents can learn to assist children with
monitoring their sources and scaffold their source decisions. As such, the goal in this study was
to investigate potential socio-linguistic processes leading to source-monitoring development and
specifically examine the role of parent-child interactions. Thus, the question I sought to address
was: Is the use of mental-state talk in parent-child joint reminiscing and storytelling associated
with children’s source-monitoring skills?
Firstly, the development of source monitoring in childhood will be discussed by
illustrating important factors such as maturational and neurological aspects that affect source
accuracy. Then, an emerging area of source-monitoring literature will be highlighted, which is
the impact of language on source accuracy. Expanding on the discussion of language, the use of
language in parent-child interactions is discussed as a potential socio-linguistic process that
shapes children’s understanding of mental representations and of the past. Specifically, the use of
mental-state talk during these interactions is elaborated on, as well as how theories of mentalstate understanding, and learning support the idea that mental-state talk may be related to source
monitoring. Finally, the purpose of this study and the hypotheses that will be tested are outlined.
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Maturational Impacts on Source Accuracy
Major improvements in source-monitoring skills tend to occur during the 3- to 8-year-old
age range (Roberts, 2002). While previous research has demonstrated inconsistent findings of
exactly which age children are able to monitor source, the general consensus is that younger
children have a more difficult time with source-monitoring tasks (Hala et al., 2016; Kanakogi et
al., 2012; Ozturk & Papafragou, 2016; Roberts et al., 2016). As mentioned, it is a difficult task
for young children to distinguish between sources of information (Brubacher et al., 2011) and
they tend to blend sources of information together or misattribute information to the wrong
source. For example, Roberts and Blades (2000) examined whether children confused memories
of different events, and specifically the age differences in these source confusions between 4year-olds and 10-year-olds. Children were questioned about events that they watched live and via
a video recording. The events were different but contained parallel details such as watching an
adult wash a doll’s leg in the live presentation versus watching the adult wash the doll’s face in
the similar video, or the adult washing kitchen utensils in the different video. Although all
children confused the sources of information (e.g., claiming that something they saw on the
video was actually witnessed live), these source confusions were greater for the 4-year-olds
compared to the 10-year-olds (Roberts & Blades, 2000). Indeed, children are not usually well
skilled in monitoring source until much later in childhood (Roberts et al., 2016). Yet studies have
shown that the emergence of these skills might appear in children as young as 2.5-years-old
(Hala et al., 2016). Comparatively, children around 3 years of age have demonstrated early
abilities in source monitoring such as being able to identify between informative and
uninformative sources (Roberts, 2002). That is, recognizing that someone who has read a story
would be informed of the details of that story compared to someone who did not read the story.
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Yet, when later asked about how they came to know certain information, children younger than 5
or 6 years of age still demonstrate difficulty with identifying a source (Roberts, 2002) such as
when they learned it or where and who they learned it from.
Depending on their age, children may be able to monitor source in one type of task before
they are able to demonstrate these skills in another type. For instance, source-monitoring tasks
may differ as to whether they are measuring external, internal, or external-internal sources. An
external task would involve distinguishing between two overt sources such as identifying if
Person A or Person B completed an action. In these tasks, the participant does not reflect on
themselves as a source, but rather is required to make a decision between two distinct sources.
Alternatively, an internal task would involve distinguishing between internal sources such as
identifying if you thought something or if you actually said it. This type of task requires the
participant to reflect on themselves as the only source, but now must distinguish between their
thoughts and own overt expressions. Finally, an external-internal or reality-monitoring task could
be employed, where one is required to distinguish between something externally perceived and
your own thoughts or imaginations (Johnson et al., 1993). For example, this assessment might be
reflected in a collaborative task, where one must consider if they placed an object, if their partner
placed it, or if one simply internalized their partner’s actions and confused performing the action
with only thinking about it (Foley & Ratner, 1998).
Some sources may be more distinct from one another, possibly allowing participants to
make better source judgements, even at a younger age, such as during reality-monitoring tasks.
In some cases, children might perform as well as adults (Johnson et al., 1993). For example, 6year-olds were not more likely than 17-year-olds to make source errors when distinguishing
between a word they had said earlier and a word the experimenter had said in a study looking at
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memory on actions (Foley et al., 1983). Further, Kanakogi et al. (2012) employed a realitymonitoring task where young children (3- to 5-years-old) were asked to discriminate between if
they placed an object or if an experimenter placed an object. Interestingly, even the 3-year-olds
performed well on source accuracy (Kanakogi et al., 2012). As children get older, they may then
begin to acquire stronger skills in other forms of source-monitoring tasks such as internal source
monitoring (Johnson et al., 1993). However, at a younger age internal tasks still prove difficult,
where 6-year-olds performed worse than 17-year-olds when distinguishing between something
they had said and something they had thought (Foley et al., 1983). Performance on source
accuracy may vary across different ages due to the type of sources being utilized during
assessment. While children may not be able to accurately monitor source on certain tasks until
they reach a particular age, it might be potentially useful to investigate additional social and
cognitive processes such as theory-of-mind understanding which may impact source-monitoring
skills across all ages and tasks.
Neurological Impacts on Source Accuracy
Throughout childhood, source monitoring is advancing alongside other critical cognitive
abilities. For instance, between the ages of 4 and 7 years, while children are developing the
ability to monitor their sources, their executive functioning skills are also advancing (Roberts &
Powell, 2005). These improvements may be dependent on the development in the frontal lobe
region, which is responsible for executive control and functioning (Roberts & Powell, 2005).
Executive functioning is referred to as “higher order cognitive processes” which underlie goaldirected behaviours (Bernier et al., 2010, p. 326). To highlight a few, these processes involve
inhibitory control, working memory, and cognitive shifting (Earhart & Roberts, 2014). These
cognitive abilities may help to monitor sources in a couple of ways such as using inhibitory
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control to bring attention to the relevant or target sources, while resisting or inhibiting the
retrieval of information from irrelevant sources (Hala et al., 2016; Roberts & Powell, 2005;
Ruffman et al. 2001). Working memory involves controlling attention and allotting cognitive
resources to specific information, and thus may assist while examining competing sources to
make a source decision (Earhart & Roberts, 2014; Hala et al., 2016). Cognitive shifting is the
process of switching one’s attention and behavioural responses between events or mental states
(Moriguchi & Sakata, 2020). Consequently, children may use this higher order process while
monitoring source, as they are required to consciously switch their attention between the sources
they are deliberating between and change to a different cognitive strategy if one fails.
As an illustration, Roberts and Powell (2005) examined the relationship between
inhibitory control and children’s suggestibility, which relates to how well one can resist
misleading information while recalling an event. A sample of 125 children aged 5 to 7 years
were recruited and were administered several tasks in a group activity such as listening to a story
or doing a puzzle. Afterwards, the children participated in an interview where a research assistant
introduced false details about the activities the children completed. Children were then asked
about the target event, and this interview incorporated both accurate and suggested details about
the event. Participants were also administered inhibitory control assessments. Children with
stronger inhibitory control skills showed greater resistance to suggested details, compared to
children with less advanced inhibitory control (Roberts & Powell, 2005). Accordingly, improved
development and functioning in the frontal lobe responsible for inhibitory control may be
necessary to strengthen children’s resistance to competing information such as suggested details,
in favour of making accurate source decisions.
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Earhart and Roberts (2014) also demonstrated the role of neurological factors on source
accuracy. They recruited a sample of 4- to 8-year-olds to participate in a source-monitoring task
that required them to distinguish between two different sources of a learning activity.
Participants also completed executive functioning tasks that measured both inhibitory control
and working memory. When examining the independent roles of executive functioning
processes, only working memory was related to source accuracy (Earhart & Roberts, 2014). Yet,
after controlling for age, these relationships were no longer significant.
Kanakogi et al. (2012) demonstrated the role of cognitive shifting in making accurate
source decisions in their study involving a sample of 3- to 5-year-old children. Children were
administered a source-monitoring task where the child and the experimenter took turns placing
two objects paired together into a box. In a questioning period, children were asked to
discriminate between themselves and the experimenter as the source of the actions. For this
activity, children’s cognitive shifting, but not inhibitory control, was related to source monitoring
(Kanakogi et al., 2012). Therefore, participants may utilize different cognitive processes
depending on the sources presented such as using inhibitory control skills to resist misleading
information in suggestibility tasks. Differently, cognitive shifting may be more prominent when
analyzing between external-internal sources such as determining if they placed the object or if
their partner did. This task may involve shifting between their own and their partner’s mental
representation of the event to make a decision about who actually placed the object.
The cognitive aspects of source monitoring such as the role of executive functioning have
been well examined, yet there still remain questions about how to improve children’s ability to
monitor source. Studies have shown that the impact of executive functioning on source
monitoring varies across the type of sources being presented. Thus, it might be advantageous to
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extend the investigation of processes that impact children’s source-monitoring skills to identify
factors that improve children’s understanding and awareness of different types of sources.
Language Impacts on Source Accuracy
One emerging area in the source-monitoring literature that has received attention is the
role of language and linguistic structure in impacting source accuracy. Specifically, the use of
evidentiality markers in language and its relation to children’s source accuracy has been
examined (Ögel-Balaban et al., 2012; Ozturk & Papafragou, 2016). Evidentiality markers in
language help to identify how knowledge was acquired. For example, there is a verbal suffix in
the Turkish language to indicate having direct experience with something. When added to the
end of a word, it shows that you came to know something directly such as seeing or hearing it
(e.g., “I saw that it was snowing”) (Ozturk & Papafragou, 2016). Thus, it is argued that children
who use languages with these markers are improving their ability to distinguish between where
information came from, as they may be more sensitized to recognizing knowledge acquired
indirectly versus directly (Ögel-Balaban et al., 2012).
To explore the role of linguistic structure in source monitoring, Ögel-Balaban et al.
(2012) recruited Turkish children aged 3 to 6 years old, given that the Turkish language is one
that uses evidentiality markers. Children completed source-monitoring tasks and linguistic tasks.
They found partial support for their hypotheses, where the use of a reportative evidentiality
marker predicted children’s source-monitoring skills (Ögel-Balaban et al., 2012). This marker
requires “children to report linguistically received information” (Ögel-Balaban et al., 2012, p.
46), in which they indicate through this marker that the source was acquired through a verbal
mode. In another study, Ozturk and Papafragou (2016) found positive correlations between
linguistic knowledge about evidentiality and source monitoring in a sample of Turkish children
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aged 5 to 7 years old. They show that as these children develop, they learn to comprehend the
use of different evidentialities (e.g., knowing if a speaker had direct or indirect experience with
something depending on the type of evidentiality they used). In turn, this comprehension helps
children infer which informant has more reliable knowledge based on their direct or indirect
experience (Ozturk & Papafragou, 2016). Consequently, as children develop a greater
understanding of linguistic knowledge such as the use of evidentiality, they may also develop
conceptual knowledge about sources and learn to consider multiple sources of information.
Ultimately, language and linguistic structure might play a role in source monitoring as it
enables speakers and listeners to become attuned to and reason about the mental states of their
conversation partners (e.g., using language to discuss how someone came to know information).
Therefore, an understanding of linking the speaker’s knowledge with their mental states may
emerge. The investigation of evidentialities has revealed the interesting role of linguistics in
improving children’s conceptual knowledge about sources. Thus, the structure of language or the
type of talk relating to knowledge states and its relation to how children discriminate sources
may warrant further investigation.
Parent-Child Interactions
With research highlighting the impact of language on source-monitoring development,
the parent-child relationship might be an interesting process to consider in children’s source
monitoring because parents are often the predominant linguistic partners of children. Further,
parents play an important part in how children remember past events (Hsiao et al., 2015; Jobson
et al., 2018; Reese et al., 2020; Valentino et al., 2014). Maternal reminiscing is one process that
can enhance children’s ability to remember past events. Specifically, the use of an elaborative
style in reminiscing has led to beneficial memory outcomes. This style uses open-ended
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questions (e.g., “What did you like about going camping?”) that allow children to describe
events in their own words versus asking yes/no questions (e.g., “Did you like going camping?”)
that simply require agreement or disagreement. Other devices include confirming children’s
responses and demonstrating sensitivity to children’s emotions about past events (Reese et al.,
2020). In mother-child reminiscing while using an elaborative style of reminiscing, children have
had more detailed memory specificity and accuracy about past events (Valentino et al., 2014),
suggesting that children can recall specific details about a particular event (e.g., how they felt
about a thunderstorm the night before) as opposed to only providing general accounts of an event
(e.g., how they usually feel when they go to the park).
Reese and colleagues (2020) recently illustrated the importance of parent-child
reminiscing about past shared events. In their longitudinal study, mothers were trained in an
intervention condition to reminisce with their children (at ages 21, 25, and 29 months) in an
elaborative nature. Compared to the control condition, mothers who received these coaching
sessions demonstrated more elaborative reminiscing with their child about positive and negative
events. After 8 years, effects persisted, where the mothers in the intervention group continued to
show more elaborative reminiscing. The children in this intervention condition also practiced
more elaborative styles of reminiscing (at age 11 years) and were able to discuss difficult life
events in a coherent fashion (Reese et al., 2020). Their findings suggest that the style parents use
to reminisce with their children may have long-term implications because being more elaborative
may impact how children recall and discuss certain life events. Over time, being more
elaborative during reminiscing may also include bringing awareness to where information comes
from. Indeed, this awareness may then help children learn to process different sources of
information while they think about and discuss past events.
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The importance of reminiscing about past events has also been extended to benefitting
children’s understanding of the mind and mental states (Fivush, 2006). Through adult-guided
reminiscing between parent and child, the narrative that is constructed moves beyond discussing
simply the facts of what happened in the event, but also begin to relate what the event meant to
the self. Accordingly, parents and children may highlight mental states about past events such as
discussing thoughts and feelings about that event or what that event meant to them (Fivush,
2006). Through these interactions, children learn that they may view the past differently than
others, while they compare how they perceived and felt about that event to their reminiscing
partner’s portrayal. Thus, children may begin to view memory as a mental representation as they
negotiate what actually happened (Fivush, 2006). That is, as children consider the differing
representations of that past event such as the difference between how they experienced it and
how their partner did, they may learn to think about different sources such as distinguishing
between informative and uninformative sources of that event or who between two sources
performed a specific action. Importantly, to recognize how to foster an understanding of past
event representations and an understanding about sources, it might be useful to examine the
specific type of talk or language used during parent-child interactions.
Mental-State Talk in Parent-Child Interactions
In parent-child interactions, children learn to organize details to form narratives that
describe the basic facts of an event such as who did an action, where it occurred, and what
happened (Welch-Ross, 1997). The process of constructing narratives during these exchanges
offers a unique opportunity for cognitive and higher order processing growth, especially when
employing specific types of talk such as mental-state talk. Mental-state talk refers to “talk about
the mind” (Jenkins et al., 2003, p. 905) and referencing one’s internal experience of an event
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(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). Utilizing mental-state talk is recognizing that other individuals have
a mind of their own, in which we can reference and attribute mental states to others and
ourselves (Miller, 2016). Mental states refer to what we think, feel, believe, or desire and are
essentially cognitive, emotional, and volitional processes (Bekar et al., 2018). These mental
states are evident in everyday life and when we reference mental states during conversation, we
are employing mental-state talk. For example, using words like “remember”, “happy”, or “want”
refers to cognitive, emotion, and desire mental states respectively.
Over time the ability to attribute these mental states becomes more advanced. Bartsch and
Wellman (1995) discuss this account in the context of children’s emerging understanding of
other peoples’ mental states. For example, young children (under 3 years of age) do not use
cognitive terms about belief and thoughts as often because they may have a limited
understanding that other people hold beliefs or internal thoughts (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995).
Hence, they utilize more desire terms to reflect their current needs of what they want. Further,
children may be less exposed to cognitive terms at a younger age, minimizing their use of this
language. For example, Ensor et al. (2014) conducted a longitudinal study with children and their
mothers to examine mental-state talk use. Children participated at age 2, 3, 6 and 10 years. At
age 2, children were exposed to more desire terms than cognitive or emotion terms. However,
when the children were 6, they were exposed to more cognitive terms compared to desire and
emotion (Ensor et al., 2014). As children grow older and develop a broader understanding of
beliefs and internal thoughts, they may be more exposed to more sophisticated mental-state
language such as cognitions, and thus might acquire the ability to identify these states.
However, the acquisition of this talk does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, mental-state talk
might be especially evident in parent-child interactions, and this style of talk may begin early in
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infancy (Miller, 2016). The production of mental-state talk and its importance for children’s
development has been consistently situated in Vygotskian theory of parental scaffolding, with
the idea that social processes play a role in nurturing children’s cognitive and higher order
functioning (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). Specifically, through interaction with parents,
children are exposed to conversations about the mind, where in these situations, parents have the
ability to scaffold the language children use to represent differing mental states and perspectives
(Tompkins et al., 2018). Through the use of mental-state talk and scaffolding, various child
cognitive, social, and emotional outcomes have emerged (Baptista et al., 2017; Bekar et al.,
2018; Ruffman et al., 2002; Yuill & Little, 2018).
Previous authors have consistently illustrated the relation between the use of parental
mental-state talk and children’s developing theory-of-mind understanding (Barreto et al., 2017;
Carr et al., 2018; Ruffman et al., 2002; Slaughter et al., 2007). Theory of mind refers to the
ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, understand that people can have different
mental states, and understand that these states are internal, but can manifest into overt behaviour
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wellman et al., 2001). Thus, theory-of-mind understanding assists
in considering mental representations and interpreting behaviours beyond our own. Ruffman et
al. (2002) examined the relations between maternal mental-state talk and children’s theory of
mind. In their longitudinal study, they recruited children 3 to 4 years of age and their mothers to
participate at three different time points. At each time point, children completed false belief
tasks, where they are tested on their ability to demonstrate an understanding that people can hold
beliefs that do not align with reality. They also completed language tasks each time. Children
and mothers also engaged in discussing a set of pictures to assess the mental-state dialogue.
Mother’s mental-state talk and utterances related to cognitions were positively related to
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children’s performance on the false belief tasks over time. This relationship remained significant
even after accounting for other factors such as child language and maternal education (Ruffman
et al., 2002), suggesting that parents and the type of language they employ during interactions do
play a critical role in children’s cognitive development.
Consistent with these findings, Slaughter et al. (2007) also demonstrated the specific
parts of mental-state talk that improve theory of mind. In Study 1 (Slaughter et al., 2007),
typically developing children aged 3 and 4 years and their mothers were recruited to participate.
Children and their mothers read a wordless storybook which was used to extract mental-state
language. Children completed a changed-location false belief understanding task as a measure of
theory of mind. They found that mental-state talk referring to cognition was positively related to
children’s theory of mind (Slaughter et al., 2007). Indeed, they also highlighted that it is the
cognitive clarification of mental states such as expanding on the thoughts of a character that is
linked to children’s theory of mind (Slaughter et al., 2007).
Other literature has outlined similar findings while examining children’s reference to
mental states. For example, Barreto et al. (2017) examined the relationship between children’s
mental-state references and theory of mind at two time points, approximately one year apart.
Children around 4.5 years of age (at time one) were recruited. Children’s references to mental
states during a shared book reading activity with their mothers were coded. They found that
children who inferred the mental states of characters demonstrated higher scores on the false
belief tasks. This finding may suggest that children who perform well on theory of mind tasks
demonstrate better understanding of the mind in real-life situations, given their tendency to refer
to mental states during book reading (Barreto et al., 2017). Interestingly though, it was the use of
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cognitive mental-state terms and not those of desire or emotion terms that had a significant
relation to theory of mind.
Expanding on higher order functioning, mental-state talk during interactions has also
been associated with children’s executive functioning. For instance, Baptista et al. (2017)
examined parental mental-state talk and children’s working memory, inhibitory control, and setshifting. Set-shifting is similar to cognitive shifting, where one uses cognitive resources to
flexibly shift between pieces of information and accordingly adapt their behaviour. A sample of
young children (around age 4.5 years) and their mothers and fathers were recruited to assess how
predictive mental-state talk was to these areas of children’s executive functioning. Only maternal
mental-state talk was related to children’s set-shifting, but not inhibitory control and working
memory (Baptista et al., 2017). This set of findings may suggest that mental-state talk is aiding
children’s ability to practice flexibility in their thinking, which may assist in considering multiple
representations of an event when presented with different sources of information.
Of particular interest, mental-state talk used during reminiscing is an important element
in parent-child interactions that impacts how children remember past events. Rudek and Haden
(2005) suggest that the use of mental-state talk during times of discussing past events is
“important in promoting children’s understanding of aspects of the mind, including memory and
what is involved in remembering over time” (p. 524). Further, using this language during
reminiscing is helpful in promoting an understanding that people hold different mental
representations of a past event, where an event might have been perceived differently for each
person (Welch-Ross, 2000). That is, when employing mental-state talk, parents are discussing
with their child not only the basic facts of the event, but also its temporal, social, emotional, and
cognitive aspects such as knowledge states, thoughts, and beliefs. Therefore, the use of mental-
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state talk during narratives might play a role in fostering children’s source-monitoring skills,
specifically the ability to distinguish between knowledge states of different agents of information
(Reese & Cleveland, 2006).
The Mental-State Reasoning Model
The mental-state reasoning model is one model that assists in explaining why the use of
mental-state talk may impact children’s source-monitoring skills such as their ability to
distinguish between agents of information. This model was initially developed to address
patterns of young children’s suggestibility (Roberts, 2002). The model proposes that there is a
link between children learning how to reason about different mental states and their
suggestibility, where a more advanced mental-state understanding should be related to less
suggestibility and better source accuracy (Welch-Ross, 2000). The development of this mentalstate understanding is based on different factors. For instance, having an awareness that there is a
connection between knowledge and experience helps children begin to reason about mental
states (Welch-Ross, 2000). The connection between knowledge and experience refers to
understanding that if someone holds a mental state of knowing something, they must have
experienced it or heard it from someone to come to know that information. For example, after
watching an adult look inside a jar, a child with this understanding would believe what an adult
told them what was inside the jar because the adult has had a direct visual experience with the
contents (Whitcombe & Robinson, 2000). However, children do not develop this awareness
immediately. Again, it is a gradual understanding between the ages of 3 to 6 years, where
younger children may still lack the ability to explicitly draw a connection between obtaining
knowledge and having a specific informative experience. For instance, children under 5 years of
age may not be able to comment on how someone obtained their knowledge such as through
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seeing, hearing, or feeling it (Roberts, 2002; Welch-Ross, 2000). Thus, as children grow older,
they transition from simply recognizing the connection between knowledge and experience, to
developing an explicit awareness that having a specific experience is linked to knowledge. As a
result, they learn to resist suggested information that does not align with these experiences.
Overall, understanding that knowledge originates from having specific experiences is critical for
the development of source monitoring (Roberts, 2002).
The mental-state reasoning model also proposes that with gradual understanding about
conflicting mental representations, children’s ability to reason about and consider multiple
sources of information improves (Evans & Roberts, 2009). Roberts (2002) highlights that source
monitoring and representational understanding are related. Representational understanding is
how one perceives or represents a single entity in their mind, most likely based on their direct
experience with it. Specifically, conflicting mental representations require us to reason about
differing mental representations of a single event. This reasoning ultimately involves considering
multiple sources of information which are attached to those representations (Roberts, 2002).
Certainly, children younger than 5 years of age have a difficult time understanding conflicting
mental representations of an event. When given misinformation, these children will update their
memories with the misinformed details of the event to only reason about one representation
(Roberts, 2002). Roberts (2002) also suggests that although some children may begin to consider
multiple representations, they likely still demonstrate source errors where they cannot attach the
source to the information they are representing. These errors may emerge possibly because while
children are improving their understanding of conflicting representations, they may still be
lacking the ability to show explicit awareness about the connection between experience and
knowledge origins.
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Bright-Paul et al. (2008) have empirically illustrated the relationship between theory of
mind and source monitoring. In support of the mental-state reasoning model, a relationship
between theory of mind and source monitoring would suggest that when children begin to reason
about mental states, they improve their ability to resist misleading information or distinguish
between sources. In Bright-Paul et al.’s study, children between the ages of 3 and 7 years old
were recruited and took part in an activity to assess their recognition, source monitoring, and
suggestibility. They first watched an event and then those in the misinformed group read a story
that contained misleading information about the initial event. Children were administered a
source test where they were asked to sort pictures from the previous events into boxes that
represented the different sources (e.g., a picture of a television on one box to represent that if that
detail happened in the film event, they were to drop the picture in that box). Those in the control
group did not receive misleading information about the initial event, and thus were not
misinformed about the target events. All participants were administered a battery of theory-of mind assessments (Bright-Paul et al., 2008). Of particular interest, there was a strong relationship
between source monitoring and theory of mind, where those with stronger overall theory-ofmind skills such as the ability to consider conflicting representations and recognize the
connections between knowledge and experience, had better source accuracy (Bright-Paul et al.,
2008, Study 2). A significant argument in terms of these findings was made by the authors,
suggesting that representational understanding and distinguishing between sources are related
due to the nature of having to employ inferencing skills. For example, neither mental states nor
connecting contents in memory with sources are directly observable and thus require some level
of inference to draw conclusions about mental states or source decisions (Bright-Paul et al.,
2008). As such, those who display greater skills in holding conflicting mental representations,
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may subsequently be able to represent multiple sources of information, and simultaneously
reflect on their memories to make accurate source decisions.
Evans and Roberts (2009) showed a similar connection between mental-state
understanding and source monitoring. They sought to investigate how knowledge acquisition,
mental-state understanding, and source monitoring are related. Children aged 3 to 5 years old
listened to a story and were later asked about details of this story in the form of yes-no
recognition questions from a knowledgeable interviewer (i.e., the person who read the story) and
a naïve interviewer (i.e., someone who was not present for the story). With each interviewer, half
of these questions were misleading, and the other half were not. The recognition questions were
followed by a source-monitoring task where children were asked to identify the source of
information about the details from the story. They also completed theory-of-mind tasks to
measure their ability to consider conflicting mental representations and understand the link
between knowledge and experience (Evans & Roberts, 2009). Mental-state understanding was
related to recognition and source monitoring. That is, children who demonstrated an
understanding that experience and information access are connected were more likely to
incorporate statements from the knowledgeable informant into their memory accounts. These
children understood that the knowledgeable interviewer had a specific experience with the event,
thus making them knowledgeable about the details (Evans & Roberts, 2009). Also, children with
better mental-state understanding, compared to those with poor understanding, were able to
accurately identify the source of the information for non-misleading questions asked by the naïve
informant. Yet, these same children demonstrated poor source accuracy regarding misleading
items that were presented by the knowledgeable informant. These results are interesting, as they
demonstrate that children were knowledgeable consumers of information because they would
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incorporate statements from a knowledgeable informant (Evans & Roberts, 2009). However,
children’s awareness of knowledge originating from experience may have overridden their
ability to monitor source when the sources involve a knowledgeable and naïve interviewer.
Granted, the study was done with a young sample whose mental-state understanding is still
emerging. Perhaps as children grow older and with more exposure to mental-state language
during parent-child interactions, children develop a more sophisticated understanding of the
mind and mental states, in which their ability to monitor sources while simultaneously
recognizing credibility improves.
The Appropriation Bias and Learning
Another area of the source-monitoring literature where the impact of mental-state talk
and mental-state understanding may be reflected is during collaborative tasks. In these sourcemonitoring tasks, children take turns with a partner to complete a task such as working together
to complete a puzzle or set up a doll house. Afterwards, children are asked to make source
decisions about who performed each action. In this way, during collaborative tasks we are
practicing distinguishing between different agents of information (Foley et al., 1993). These
collaborative tasks might warrant a representational process, in which the self takes on the
mental experience of the partner performing an action in the task (Foley et al., 1993). In doing
so, one has to use their source-monitoring skills to distinguish between self-performed and otherperformed actions. Yet there is a phenomenon during these collaborative tasks and subsequent
source monitoring, where children tend to appropriate or internalize their partner’s actions as
their own. The person-based perspective model of source monitoring labels these misattributions
as an appropriation bias, or the “I did it” bias, where children falsely identify themselves as the
agent of an action, rather than their partner or their imagined self (Foley et al., 1993; Ford et al.,
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2011). Alternatively, a “You did it” error would be when a child claims that their partner
completed an action, when actually the child did but these latter errors are rarer than “I did it”
errors.
The appropriation bias has been highlighted in the source-monitoring literature (Foley et
al., 1993; Foley & Ratner, 1998; Ford et al., 2011; Hala et al., 2016). For example, Foley et al.
(1993) recruited children aged 4, 6, and 8 years old. The child and an experimenter took turns
placing puzzle pieces onto poster board to create either an abstract or identifiable collage. After
finishing the collages and having a small break, children were then asked to identify who placed
which piece in the collage. The appropriation bias, where children would inaccurately claim they
placed a puzzle piece (when the adult placed it), was more pronounced compared to the reverse.
That is, the child claiming that the experimenter placed the piece (when the child had placed it),
occurred fewer times than children making “I did it” errors. Further, this bias was most evident
with the 4-year-olds (Foley et al., 1993). Ford et al. (2011) also found support for the
appropriation bias. Participants aged 4 and 5 years of age were recruited and completed a
collaborative task where they matched picture cards to pictures on a board. Children played with
the researcher, but also two toy dolls, who also had turns to match the pictures. Children were
then asked a series of questions about the game such as if they remember the picture during the
game and who placed it on the board. The appropriation bias emerged, where children were more
likely to claim that they had placed the picture, when actually the experimenter or their doll
partner did. However, this bias was especially pronounced between the human sources, possibly
because children recognized the experimenter as a human with internal thoughts and beliefs and
thus would be more likely to share their intentions during a joint activity (Ford et al., 2011).
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In a collaborative task, children may be more likely to make source confusions through
the process of recoding the actions of their partner while working towards a shared goal. Yet,
theories of learning presented by Foley and Ratner and colleagues illustrates that while these
source confusions may be evident, it is through these collaborative tasks and internalizing other’s
actions that learning is facilitated (Foley et al., 1993; Ratner et al., 2002). Indeed, during a
collaborative task a player might consider the differing mental representations of their partner to
understand the task or why it is carried out in a certain way (Ratner et al., 2002). In other words,
they may wonder “what it feels like” to perform the action as their partner. This process
encourages children to learn from their partner by understanding their actions. Ratner and
colleagues (2002) argue that the more children are able to internalize the actions of their partner,
or take on their perspective, learning will be enhanced, compared to children who cannot
internalize other’s behaviours. However, source errors and the appropriation bias would
subsequently increase because of children recoding the partner’s actions and then forgetting who
actually placed the item during retrieval (Ratner et al., 2002).
Previous literature has highlighted this learning process. Ratner et al. (2002, Experiment
1) recruited children aged 5 and 6 years to examine children’s source errors and categorization in
both collaborative and non-collaborative tasks which involved organizing furniture in a doll
house. Children in the collaboration condition would plan where the furniture would go, but the
child and experimenter took turns placing the items. In the non-collaboration condition, a few
furniture pieces were already set in the dollhouse by the experimenter, and the child followed the
experimenter’s instructions to finish placing the remaining items. The bias to claim actions as
their own was evident in the findings, where children in the collaboration condition were more
likely to make this error than those in the non-collaboration group. Interestingly, children who
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experienced collaborative interaction also learned more from the task compared to the noncollaboration group. This learning was reflected in their ability to correctly re-organize the
furniture into the doll house following the completion of their original categorization (Ratner et
al., 2002). Importantly, these findings do not highlight that source errors mean less advanced
cognitive processes. Rather, it demonstrates that in some contexts, the benefit of learning may
override the importance of distinguishing between agents of information. Therefore, while
source errors may emerge while children recall an event, they might simply be a reflection of
children’s growing understanding of mental states beyond their own.
Current Study
Until now, the examined literature has predominantly focused on the maturational aspects
and the cognitive factors that impact the development of children’s source-monitoring skills. For
instance, major improvements in children’s source monitoring develop with age, alongside
neurological developments such as executive functioning like working memory, inhibitory
control, and cognitive shifting that are advancing at the same time (Earhart & Roberts, 2014;
Hala et al., 2016; Kanakogi et al., 2012). While these factors have been well documented, source
errors are still evident, especially for young children. Thus, investigating additional processes
that may impact children’s source monitoring demands attention. More recently, the impact of
language on source accuracy has been identified (Ögel-Balaban et al., 2012), yet there remains
limited research in this area. The role of language in parent-child interactions warrants attention
because parents are children’s predominant linguistic partners, and these interactions play an
integral role in helping children to form narratives about the past (Valentino et al., 2014).
Further, the type of lexicon such as mental-state talk used during these interactions has been
associated to children’s theory of mind. Theory of mind has been a consistent reference in
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cognitive development for recognizing children’s growing understanding of mental states
(Tompkins et al., 2018). As previous studies have shown, mental-state understanding has been
associated with children’s source monitoring (Welch-Ross, 2000).
As a result, the current study employed a reality-monitoring source-monitoring task to
address the following question: Is the use of mental-state talk in parent-child joint reminiscing
and storytelling associated with children’s source-monitoring skills in a collaborative activity?
Based on previous literature, three hypotheses derived from the mental-state reasoning model
and theories of learning were tested. The first hypothesis is targeted at the recognition of items
during the collaborative task to test whether the use of mental-state talk is related to children’s
recognition of the items presented. According to the mental-state reasoning model it is expected
that higher proportions of mother and child mental-state talk used in parent-child interactions
will be associated with higher levels of accurate recognition of items in the source-monitoring
activity. Accurate recognition will be represented by children’s ability to recognize the items that
were in the activity, as well as correctly reject items that were not in the activity. Welch-Ross
(2000) discusses in their review that children who can reason about conflicting mental
representations should be able to consider multiple memories such as original items and new
items during retrieval. In this way, more exposure to mental-state talk should be related to more
accurate recognition of the items presented in the collaborative activity.
The second hypothesis will be targeted at the relationship between the use of mental-state
talk and children’s source accuracy. Informed by the mental-state reasoning model, it is expected
that mother and child mental-state talk used in parent-child joint reminiscing and storytelling
will be positively related to children’s source accuracy. This hypothesis is supported by previous
literature which highlights the relationship between mental-state understanding such as theory of
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mind, and source monitoring in child samples (Bright-Paul et al., 2008; Evans & Roberts, 2009;
Ford et al., 2011). Essentially, the mental-state reasoning model posits that sophisticated mentalstate understanding teaches children that people have different perspectives and representations
of events. Using mental-state talk to scaffold this understanding promotes flexibility in thinking
and helps children reason about mental states beyond their own (Welch-Ross, 2000). As a result,
this thinking translates into recognizing different perspectives, representations of events, and
thus perhaps learning to distinguish between agents of information (Reese & Cleveland, 2006).
The third hypothesis is situated around the type of source errors children produce in the
source-monitoring task and the relation to mental-state talk. Given the collaborative nature of the
source-monitoring task in the current study, when children make source errors, it is expected that
mothers’ and children’s use of mental-state talk will be positively related to the “I did it” error
and negatively related to the “You did it” error. This hypothesis is informed by theories of
learning presented by Foley and Ratner (1998). During a collaborative task with a shared
common goal, children may demonstrate source confusions such as the appropriation bias, where
they recode their partner’s actions as their own. Yet, the ability to recode a partner’s action
arrives with a sophisticated mental-state understanding where we are recognizing mental states
beyond our own and taking on the perspective of someone else. The more frequent use of
mental-state talk helps to facilitate this advanced understanding (Barreto et al., 2017). While
generally source accuracy would also improve as children’s mental-state understanding
develops, at the same time children are applying their developing understanding of mental states
to facilitate learning in other domains such as when taking on the perspective of someone else
while trying to learn from them and their actions (e.g., during a classroom activity with a partner
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or group). That is, as children develop a stronger understanding of mental states, the content they
are learning during collaboration may take priority over making accurate source decisions.
Method
Design
The current study sought to examine the use of mental-state talk produced by motherchild dyads during joint parent-child construction of narratives (e.g., when reminiscing or
storytelling). In particular, the association between narrative quality and source-monitoring skills
was examined.
At the first visit, the mother-child dyads reminisced about two past events and shared a
wordless story book. The joint narratives were coded for mental-state talk. Children also
completed vocabulary and various cognitive assessments. During the second session, children
were asked about the source-monitoring task from the first visit and completed two executive
functioning tasks. The focus of the current study is to examine the use of mental-state and
children’s source-monitoring, and therefore only the measures and procedures pertaining to
mental-state talk, receptive vocabulary, and source-monitoring tasks will be discussed.
Children’s source-monitoring scores will be used to see whether they are impacted by the
increasing use of mental-state talk, while receptive vocabulary will be used as a covariate.
To capture this relationship, children between the ages of 3 and 6 years old and their
mothers were invited to participate in two sessions that took place over a video call platform
called Zoom.
Participants
A sample of 35 mother-child dyads were recruited to participate. One dyad was excluded
from analyses due to the child being diagnosed with a developmental disorder. Thus, the sample
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consisted of 34 mother-child dyads. Children ranged in age from 37-80 months (M = 58.70
months, SD = 12.90). There were 15 children ages 3-4 years old and 19 children ages 5-6 years
old. Mothers ranged in age from 25-42 years (M = 33.97, SD = 3.96). The sample of children
were split rather evenly in gender, with 52.9% identifying as female and 47.1% identifying as
male. All of the parent participants identified as female. The majority of participants were white
(88.2%), whereas the others identified as Caucasian/Asian, black, or another ethnicity. In relation
to maternal education, 11.8% held a high school diploma, 29.4% held a college degree or
diploma, 38.2% had a bachelor’s degree, 17.6% had a master’s degree, and 2.9% had a PhD.
Household income ranged from the grouping of $25 000-$50 000 to the group of more than $200
000, with 41% of the participants reporting an income of $100 000-$200 000. Only one mother
reported having only one child, whereas the rest had between 2-4 children. For the children with
siblings, 38.2% of the children participating were older than their sibling, 50% were younger,
5.9% had siblings both older and younger, and one mother preferred not to report.
Dyads were recruited by circulating digital invitational posters to mothers through social
media posts. Further, a snowballing technique or a word-of-mouth technique to recruit was
implemented where the invitational message to participate was encouraged to be shared among
acquaintances of participants who have already been recruited or know someone who they think
will enjoy participating. Mothers were informed that the study involves two online visits in a
Zoom meeting and were asked to confirm that they will be available for two dates, scheduled
two to three days apart. Participants were provided compensation for their participation in the
form of a $50 gift e-card per family. Before participation, mothers were asked for their digitally
signed informed consent, as well as their verbal consent upon entering the Zoom meeting.
Children were asked if they want to have a conversation with their mom, listen to a story, and
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play a few games with the researcher and their mom as means of obtaining verbal assent (see
Appendix A).
Materials
The measures selected are age-appropriate and have been widely used for determining
children’s vocabulary and cognitive skills (Barreto et al., 2017; Earhart & Roberts, 2014; Perner
et al., 1987; Tompkins, 2015; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).
Joint Reminiscing
The joint reminiscing task consisted of the mother and the child reminiscing on past
events that they have experienced together. Before the first meeting, mothers were asked to think
about the two events they want to discuss during this task. They were asked to only share what
they chose to discuss with the researcher, and not with their child. One of the events to discuss
was a specific time from something that happens more than once. For example, discussing a
specific time they visited Grandma’s house. The second event to discuss was something that has
only happened one time such as when they went on a trip to a waterpark. Instructions given to
the mothers were adapted from Reese and Cleveland (2006), where maternal reminiscing styles
were examined to understand their links to children’s autobiographical memory and theory of
mind. Mothers were instructed to choose events that are unique, rather than events that are
scripted routines, and that the child would remember. For example, although visiting Grandma’s
house might be something the child does often, the mother was asked to discuss a unique event
from these visits such as the time they got to have a water balloon fight at Grandma’s.
Furthermore, events should be short in duration such as only occurring on one day and should
not already follow a set storyline such as discussing a movie or book.
Storybook Task
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In the storybook task, parents read the book, Frog, Where Are You? by Mercer Mayer
(1969) to their child. The book is a wordless storybook and illustrates a child and their pet dog
trying to find their missing frog. This book provides opportunities for readers to talk about and
address different mental states of the characters (e.g., desires, beliefs, cognitions), and thus it was
chosen for its potential to elicit mental-state talk while constructing a story (Bekar et al., 2018).
While the current study used the story to assess mental-state talk, the story has been used to
examine developmental linguistics, shared reading, and has elicited narratives cross-culturally
(Bekar et al., 2018). The study took place online, and thus this book was provided in an online
format for mothers and children to view on their computer screens.
Vocabulary Assessment
Child vocabulary skills were measured using the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
Fourth Edition (PPVT-4; Dunn & Dunn, 2007). The PPVT-4 is a highly referenced, standardized
measure which assesses receptive vocabulary skills in individuals from 2-90 years of age.
Participants are only tested on the items that are at the appropriate level of difficulty for that
participant. To administer, the researcher says a word and participants are instructed to point to
one of four presented pictures that corresponds to the spoken word. The PPVT-4 has test-retest
reliability of .93.
Source-Monitoring Activity
The farm placement task used in Hala et al. (2016), with slight modifications as noted
below, was utilized in the current study as a measure of children’s source-monitoring skills.
Constructing the farm. The farm construction activity occurred at the first visit and was
shown in PowerPoint Presentation and screen shared on Zoom. To begin the activity, children
were shown an empty toy barn on the screen and were told that while working together with their
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mom, they will take turns picking different farm animals to put into the barn. Twelve farm
animals were in the presentation that children and their mothers could choose from to move into
the toy barn. When it was a player’s turn, the researcher asked the player to pick an animal to
move into the barn. Participants were encouraged to instruct the animal to move into the barn
(e.g., “[Pig] move into the barn!”) (see Appendix D). The researcher then clicked and dragged
the animal chosen across the screen and into the toy barn. The researcher would then verbally
congratulate or state, “Good job! You (child or mother) moved the [pig] into the barn!” The
mother and the child took turns picking a farm animal to place into the barn until all 12 animals
were in the barn. The order of who went first was alternated across participants.
Source questions. The source questions were administered at the second visit and took
place in a Zoom meeting. Farm animals were shown in a PowerPoint Presentation and screen
shared on Zoom. Prior to starting the testing trials, two training trials occurred. The two items
were pulled randomly from the selection of animals that were originally placed in the farm. One
trial was an item that the child chose during the farm game, and the other trial was an item that
the mother chose (alternated across participants for which item was presented first). Children
received feedback during the training trials such as letting the child know when they responded
incorrectly.
Then the testing trials began. There was a memory question and a source question for
each item: 10 items that were from the original farm game (real) and five items that were not in
the farm game (distractors), which would also be animals that would appear on a farm. The real
and distractor item arrangements had two fixed versions, which were alternated across
participants (i.e., the distractor items were different in the two versions). The questioning started
when the researcher presented the first farm animal on the screen (e.g., pig) and first asked the
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child if the item was in the farm game from the first visit (“Was the pig in the farm game you
played with your mom?”). If the child said yes, they were then asked who picked the item (e.g.,
the pig) to be moved into the barn. The order of asking the child if they picked the animal versus
if their mom picked the animal was alternated for each item (e.g., “Did your mom pick the pig or
did you pick the pig?” or “Did you pick the duck or did your mom pick the duck?”). If the child
answered “no” when asked if the farm animal was in the game, no further questions were asked
about that item and the next item was shown. This type of questioning continued until they
discussed each real item and each distractor item. In other words, there were two questions: One
for memory and one for source of placement (self or other) for each real item and distractor item
(see Appendix D).
Procedure
Prior to the first virtual visit, mothers were asked to complete the informed consent form,
a demographic questionnaire that included items such as child age, gender, maternal education,
household income, and ethnicity, and a rating of their child’s behaviour. The consent information
and questionnaires were distributed on Qualtrics and were emailed ahead of time so that mothers
could complete the forms before participating in the first Zoom meeting. Once these tasks were
completed, and after obtaining informed consent, the study commenced, which consisted of two
sessions with each mother-child dyad in an online Zoom meeting. The researcher was the only
one present from the research team during the virtual visits. At the first virtual visit, the
researcher first took a few minutes to introduce themselves and build a rapport with the mother
and the child (see Appendix A and Appendix E). Participants were also instructed on how to set
up their screens in the Zoom meeting to allow for easy viewing of everything on the screen such
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as moving their videos to one side of the screen or making sure they could see both themselves
and the researcher.
The first activity of the first session involved each dyad participating in two tasks: The
joint reminiscing and the storybook activity. For the joint reminiscing task (see Materials),
mothers and their child engaged in a reminiscing activity where mothers were instructed to
discuss two recent events with their child. Mothers were told to discuss the events in a way that
is natural and comfortable for them, while also speaking closely and clearly into the webcam to
make sure the researcher can identify who is speaking (see Appendix B and Appendix E). Each
narrative session took about 10 to 15 minutes. The other task at the first visit was the storybook
task. For this activity, the wordless storybook (see Materials) was presented on the shared Zoom
screen (see Appendix E). Mothers were told briefly what the book is about (e.g., “this book is
about a boy, a dog, and a frog”). Then, they were asked to make up a story using the pictures and
characters in the book and to tell the story to their child. Before the task began, the researcher
flipped through the first few pages of the story so that mothers had a chance to look through the
book to give them a sense of the content. They were asked if they understand the task and told
that they could start whenever they were ready (see Appendix B). This activity took about 5-7
minutes each session. The researcher was present on the Zoom meeting for both narrative
construction activities as a way to assist in providing cues to the mother during either activity if
necessary (e.g., if the mother got stuck on how to continue the conversation or if they forgot
what type of event to talk about). The session was screen recorded and the order of the narrative
activity and the storybook activity was counterbalanced, but these two activities were always the
first activities of the sessions.
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Following these two activities, children were administered the vocabulary assessment and
the source-monitoring activity all in a virtual format on Zoom. For instance, the PPVT-4 was
administered virtually by displaying the options using the PPVT-4 Digital Stimulus Book, screen
sharing the page, and adding a coloured border to each of the options (green, blue, red, and
yellow) (see Appendix E). When asked to identify the picture that matches the spoken word,
children were asked to say which coloured border corresponds with that picture to indicate their
answer. Children were tested before beginning to confirm they knew the colours (see Appendix
A). Similarly, the source-monitoring activity also used screen sharing settings in Zoom to
administer the task, where the researcher screen shared the presentation of the toy barn and
animals (see Materials) so the participants could see their options to pick and could watch as the
animals were moved into the barn by the researcher’s cursor (see Appendix E). The order of
these tasks was counterbalanced across participants. The combination of these activities took
about 30-40 minutes. All of the activities during the first visit were screen and audio recorded
using QuickTime on the researcher’s computer, as well as Zoom cloud recording. The entire first
visit usually took no longer than 1 hour.
The second visit occurred 2 to 3 days after the initial visit. This visit occurred in a Zoom
meeting again and involved a conversation between the child and the researcher where the
researcher asked source questions about the source-monitoring activity from the first visit. While
the second visit only required responses from the child participant, mothers were asked to sit
with their child during this session to help keep their child focused on the tasks. Before
beginning, the researcher spent a couple minutes building a rapport with the child again. Verbal
consent from the mothers and child assent were also obtained again (see Appendix A and E).
Afterwards, the source-monitoring questions about the farm game began (see Materials). The
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screen sharing option in Zoom was used to present the real and distractor items on the screen for
the child to see while answering the questions (see Appendix E). This session was also video,
and screen recorded using QuickTime and Zoom cloud recording. The second visit in total took
about 20-25 minutes. Following the ending of this visit, both mothers and children were
reminded about the purpose of this study and thanked for their participation. They were also
emailed a $50 e-gift card in compensation.
Data Coding
Mental-State Talk Coding
Transcripts were loaded into NVIVO 12 (QSR International, 2021) to analyze the use of
mental-state talk in the parent-child interactions. The coding followed a guideline developed by
the research team which was informed by prior research on mental-state talk (Bartsch &
Wellman, 1995; Jenkins et al., 2003; Rudek & Haden, 2005; Ruffman et al., 2002; Shatz et al.,
1983). The guideline listed which terms we searched for, definitions, how to identify a genuine
mental state instance, and exclusions. Once transcripts were loaded, a text search query was
performed where a predetermined list of mental-state terms was entered to be searched for within
every transcript (refer to Appendix C for a full list of the terms).
When performing the text search query, the list of terms was separated into five
categories: Cognitive, desire, emotion/feeling, modulation of assertion, and other. The cognitive
category involved terms that referred to thoughts, memories, or knowledge (e.g., think, know,
believe). The desire domain referred to terms that captured desires or goals, wishes or hopes, or
showed expressions of desire (e.g., want, dream, hope, wish). The emotion and feeling category
involved terms that referred to an emotional or feeling state such as the state of enjoyment (e.g.,
happy, like, scared, frustrated). Modulation of assertion referred to any terms that helped to
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indicate the degree of certainty about a mental state (e.g., maybe, possibly, might, sure) and the
other category was any other mental-state terms that did not fall into the categories already listed
(e.g., remind, consider, dreaming in terms of while asleep). The terms were categorized into
these domains to assist with the process of coding and understand the way each term refers to
different mental states.
Each transcript was then scanned to un-code any term that was not a genuine mental-state
reference. A genuine mental-state reference was judged using the context of the conversation and
was any term that demonstrated a true referral to the mental state of the speaker, listener or a
third person. The definitions of the categories were used to help determine these genuine
instances. This task was performed because terms in the predetermined list could be considered
not genuine, depending on the context it was used in. For example, the term “like” could be used
to refer to an emotion or desire state where they “like” a certain toy or “would like” to go
somewhere, as follows:
C: I liked to get the lemon drink
However, the term “like” can also be used in a conversational or comparison nature, in which it
does not reference a mental state such as:
M: And they had things like cotton candy, and popcorn
This scanning process also took place to un-code any exclusions, which were terms that had a
conversational function, rather than referencing mental states (e.g., “I wanna”, “You know
what?”), were repetitions of a previous use of the term such as if the mother directly repeated
what the child said with no change in content, or terms that were referring to overt behaviours
rather than internal mental states such as crying, laughing or smiling. Further, any of the
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researcher’s talk that was originally included in the conversation and used mental-state terms
such as when delivering instructions, was excluded.
Overlapping category terms were also addressed. In the predetermined list of mental-state
terms, there were a few terms that could fit into two categories. For example, “like” or “love”
could be an emotional and feeling term or a desire term. Similarly, “guess” could be a cognitive
term or a modulation of assertion term. Each term that was coded at two different categories was
analyzed and a decision was made to only code it at one category. This decision was based on
putting the term into a conversational window and using the context of the conversation to make
a judgement. The mental-state talk coding was completed by the principal investigator and one
other trained research assistant. The principal investigator reviewed every transcript, and the
research assistant was given 15% of the transcripts to code. Inter-rater reliability was calculated
to assess the agreement amongst the mental-state terms in each category. Agreement was high
where Cohen’s kappa ranged from 0.91 to 1. Disagreements between which terms constituted as
genuine mental state instances were solved through discussions between the two coders which
resulted in fixing the code to reflect the final decision. Mental-state terms for the different types
of talk were calculated into proportional values. This process involved dividing the number of
mental-state terms in a category by the total number of mental-state talk and was done for both
mother and child. For instance, the proportional value of cognitive terms for mothers was
calculated by dividing the total number of cognitive terms spoken by the mother by the total
frequency of mental-state talk spoken by the mother across the entire interaction (reminiscing
and storytelling combined). These proportional values were used in exploratory analyses.
Mental-state terms were also generated into proportional values by dividing the number
of mental-state terms by the number of utterances. Mothers and children vary in the amount of
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talk they produce during interactions, and thus verbosity was controlled for by tracking the
number of utterances in each interaction period. The principal investigator and five research
assistants completed the utterance tracking, where the total number of utterances for the child in
the storybook activity and reminiscing were counted, as well as the mother. Research assistants
were trained how to count utterances in the transcripts until their percentage agreement with the
principal investigators was high. Final percentage agreements ranged from .90 to .96. Utterances
were defined as a group of words bounded by a period, exclamation mark, question mark, or
sometimes a comma or the word “and”, “but”, or “so” if it was a run-on sentence (Jenkins et al.,
2003). Usually, an utterance contained at least three words and was a phrase that presented a
thought or idea and could stand alone. Phrases that were excluded from being counted involved
any of the researcher’s talk during the sessions, exact repetitions or imitations of previous
utterances without providing additional content, a false start (i.e., starting a sentence without
finishing it before presenting a thought), single yes-no responses, and singing (Shatz & Gelman,
1973).
Mental-state proportions for both the storybook and reminiscing mental-state talk were
created for each child (i.e., child’s total mental-state terms in the storybook and reminiscing
divided by their total number of utterances in the storybook and reminiscing respectively) and
each mother (i.e., mother’s total mental-state terms in the storybook and reminiscing divided by
their total number of utterances in the storybook and reminiscing respectively). A total mentalstate talk variable was also generated for each interaction activity (i.e., total mental-state terms in
storybook divided by total number of utterances in the storybook, and similarly for the
reminiscing terms and utterances). These proportional values were used in analyses.
Source-Monitoring Test
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Performance on the source-monitoring test was evaluated based on recognition of real
and distractor items, and source-identification accuracy (i.e., recognizing whether the action was
a self or other action).
Correct recognition of real items, called hits, were defined as answering “yes” to the
memory question (e.g., “Was the [pig] in the farm game you played with your mom”). Incorrect
recognition of real items, called misses, were defined as answering “no” to the memory question.
Hits were then separated into self-hits or other hits, where a self-hit was a real item the child
recognized that they picked and an other hit was a real item that the child recognized that the
mother picked. Each hit was awarded one point. Given there were 10 real items tested on, the
maximum number of hits could be 10 (i.e., five self-hits and five other hits).
If a child answered “no” to a distractor item, this was called a correct rejection,
demonstrating they recognized that the item was not in the game. If a child answered “yes” to a
distractor item, this was called a false alarm, which showed that the child thought they
recognized the item from the game, yet the item was new. Each correct rejection and false alarm
were given one point. The score of the correct rejections and the score of the false alarms would
total five, given there were five distractor items tested on. Therefore, the maximum number of
correct rejections could be five and the max number of false alarms could also be five.
The recognition of real items was calculated into proportions. Hit and miss proportions
were generated by dividing the total number of hits or misses by the total number of real items.
Self and other hit proportions were calculated similarly, where the total number of self or other
hits were divided by the total number of real items placed by the child or the mother,
respectively. Correct rejection and false alarm proportions were the number of correct rejections
or false alarms divided by the total number of distractor items. A corrected recognition score was
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calculated to adjust for any potential bias in responses by subtracting false alarm proportions
from the hit proportions. This new variable represented accurate recognition and was used in
analyses when examining recognition of real items.
Source accuracy on real items was evaluated based on whether the child could correctly
identify the source of a real item when asked the source questions (i.e., “Did your mom pick the
[pig] or did you pick the [pig] to move into the barn?”). Source correct was defined as when the
child correctly identified the source of who picked the item (i.e., they identified either
themselves or the mother as the source correctly). Source correct was separated into self-correct
or other-correct, where a self-correct was when the child correctly identified themselves as the
source and an other-correct was when they correctly identified their mother as the source. A
source error was defined as when the child incorrectly identified the source of who picked the
item, which was then separated into an “I did it” error and a “You did it” error. An “I did it”
error was when the child reported themselves as the source, when it was the mother who picked
the item. A “You did it” error was when the child reported their mother as the source, when it
was the child who picked the item.
The source accuracy of real items was also calculated into proportions. Source correct
and total source error proportions were generated by dividing the total number of source correct
or total source error out of the total number of hits for that participant. Self and other correct
proportions were calculated by dividing the total number of self-correct and other correct by the
total number of self-hits and other hits, respectively. “I did it” error proportions were the total
number of “I did it” errors divided by the total number of other hits. “You did it” error
proportions were the total number of “You did it” errors divided by the total number of self-hits.
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These error proportions were to reflect the percentage that a child claimed they picked an item,
when the mother actually did, and vice versa.
Results
In the current study, the relationship between the use of mental-state talk produced by
mother-child dyads during parent-child joint reminiscing and storytelling and children’s source
monitoring to distinguish between self and other actions was examined. The data entry was
checked for outliers before beginning analyses using SPSS Statistics Version 27. Only one case
was removed from analyses due to it having multiple missing values and outliers across
variables, resulting in a sample size of 33 for the remaining analyses.
Descriptive Analyses
Descriptive information about the variables under study are provided in Tables 1-4 (raw
values are Tables 2 and 4). Children’s proportion of mental-state talk use across both the
reminiscing and storytelling activities ranged from .00 - .69 (M = .22, SD = .15), while mothers’
proportion of mental-state talk across both interaction activities ranged from .14 - .41 (M = .24,
SD = .07). These proportions highlight the participants’ total mental-state talk use of out their
total utterances during the parent-child interactions.
Analyses were conducted to examine how mental-state talk produced by mother-child
dyads were used differently between the reminiscing and storybook tasks. Paired sample t-tests
revealed that there was a significant difference between the total proportion of mental-state talk
in the reminiscing activity compared to the storybook activity, t (32) = -.413, p < 0.001, d = .718,
CI [-.127, -.043] where the combined proportion of mental-state talk for mothers and children
was greater in the reminiscing activity than the storybook activity (Table 1). When examining
the use of mental-state talk in the entire interaction (i.e., wordless storybook and reminiscing
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activities combined), paired sample t-tests revealed that there were no significant differences
between the proportion of mental-state talk used by children compared to the mother, t (32) = .44, p = .66, d = 0.08, 95% CI [-.07, .05] (Table 1). Further, there were no significant differences
between mother’s proportion of mental-state talk and the child’s proportion of mental-state talk
during the reminiscing activity alone, t (32) = 2.04, p = 0.05, d = .352, CI [.001, .14], or the
storybook activity alone, t (32) = -.39, p = .70, d = .064, CI [-.11, .08] (Table 1). Overall, there
were no differences between mothers and children in the proportion of mental-state talk used
during the entire conversation, reminiscing, or storytelling. However, when combining mother
mental-state talk and child mental-state talk, there was a greater amount of mental-state talk used
in reminiscing compared to storytelling.
Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges for Mother and Children’s Mental-State Talk Scores in
Reminiscing, Storytelling, and Total Mental-State Talk in Conversations
Variable
n
M
SD
Range
Child Total MST
33
.22
.15
.00-.69
Mother Total MST
33
.24
.07
.14-.41
Total MST
33
.23
.06
.14-.38
Child Rem. MST
33
.22
.17
.00-.69
Mother Rem. MST
33
.29
.13
.13-.85
Total Rem. MST
33
.26
.09
.11-.44
Child Story MST
33
.19
.26
.00-.100
Mother Story MST
33
.17
.08
.04-.34
Total Story MST
33
.18
.08
.03-.36
Note. MST = mental-state talk. Rem. = reminiscing. All scores are proportional values.
Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges for Mother and Children’s Raw Mental-State Talk
Scores in Reminiscing, Storytelling, and Total Mental-State Talk in Conversations
Variable
Child Total MST

n
33

M
9.35

SD
6.48

Range
0-25
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Mother Total MST
33
45.15
20.59
Total MST
33
54.52
23.48
Child Rem. MST
33
7.88
5.82
Mother Rem. MST
33
30.36
14.48
Total Rem. MST
33
38.24
17.40
Child Story MST
33
1.48
2.69
Mother Story MST
33
14.79
11.96
Total Story MST
33
16.27
13.82
Note. MST = mental-state talk. Rem. = reminiscing. All scores are raw values.

20-103
23-111
0-25
12-60
13-85
0-12
2-55
2-67

Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges for Children’s Recognition and Source-monitoring
Scores, Age, and Vocabulary
Variable
n
M
SD
Range
Accurate Recognition
33
.40
.29
-.10-.90
Source Accuracy
33
.62
.17
.30-.90
“I did it” Error
33
.32
.25
.00-.80
“You did it” Error
33
.39
.33
.00-1.00
Child Age (in months)
33
58.70
12.90
37-80
Child Receptive Vocab (raw)
31
100.10
23.95
60-146
Note. All recognition and source-monitoring scores are proportional values.
Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges for Children’s Raw Recognition and Sourcemonitoring scores
Variable
Accurate Recognition
Source Accuracy
“I did it” Error
“You did it” Error
Note. All scores are raw values.

n
33
33
33
33

M
6.33
5.36
1.39
1.76

SD
1.53
1.82
1.17
1.44

Range
3-9
2-9
0-4
0-5

Correlations
Bivariate zero-order and partial correlations (one-tailed) were also conducted to examine
associations between children’s age in months, receptive vocabulary, mental-state talk,
recognition, and source monitoring. To target the hypotheses under study, of particular interest
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were the correlations between mental-state talk and recognition, and mental-state talk and source
monitoring. The correlations analyses revealed that source accuracy was significantly and
positively related to mother’s mental-state talk in reminiscing (r = .32, p = .036). This
relationship remained significant after controlling for children’s age in months and receptive
vocabulary (r = .32, p = .047). Further, children’s “You did it” source error was significantly and
negatively related to total mental-state talk in reminiscing (r = -.32, p = .037); however, this
relationship was no longer significant after controlling for children’s age in months and receptive
vocabulary (r = -.30, p = .058). None of the other correlations between mental-state talk and
recognition, and mental-state talk and source monitoring were statistically significant (Table 5
and Table 6). Overall, maternal mental-state talk in the reminiscing task has a relationship with
some source-monitoring performance such as a positive relationship between mother’s mentalstate talk and source accuracy and a negative relationship between mother and child mental-state
talk combined and “You did it” errors. However, only mother’s mental-state talk and children’s
source accuracy are significantly correlated over and above the effects of children’s age and
vocabulary.
Preliminary Analyses
Age and gender analyses were conducted using one-way multivariate analysis of
variances (MANOVA) and independent t-tests to explore developmental and gender-related
differences in the proportion of mental-state talk in storybook reading and reminiscing,
recognition, and source monitoring. Children’s age was separated into two groups as a new
variable (3- and 4-year-olds and 5- and 6-year-olds) for these analyses instead of using age in
months to compare the developmental differences across developmental periods.
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Zero-order Bivariate Correlation Table
Variable
1.
2.
3.
1.Age
—
2. Vocab
.76**
—
3. Source Accuracy
.21
.07
—
4. “I did it” Error
-.23
.02
-.34*
5. “You did it” Error .02
-.07
-.72**
6. Recognition
.60**
.50** .26
7. Mother MST Rem. .32*
.38*
.32*
8. Child MST Rem.
-.22
-.04
.11
9. Mother MST Story -.01
.20
.17
10. Child MST Story .21
.18
-.09
11. Total MST Rem
.12
.28
.26
12. Total MST Story .04
.21
.16
Note. MST = mental-state talk. Rem. = Reminiscing.
*p <.05. **p <.01, one-tailed.
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4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

—
-.35*
-.24
-.02
.12
.06
.13
.06
.08

—
-.05
-.29
-.25
-.24
-.02
-.32*
-.25

—
.02
.11
-.04
.13
-.05
.02

—
.09
.32*
.07
.80**
.34*

—
-.36*
-.17
.55**
-.37*

—
.08
.05
.99**

—
-.13
.20

—
.04

—

Table 6
Partial Correlations Controlling for Age and Vocabulary
Variable
1.
2.
3.
1.Source Accuracy
—
2. “I did it” Error
-.28
—
3. “You did it” Error
-.77**
-.33*
—
4. Recognition
.18
-.17
-.06
5. Mother MST Rem. .32*
-.02
-.29
6. Child MST Rem.
.19
.02
-.23
7. Mother MST Story .23
-.04
-.21
8. Child MST Story
-.14
.19
-.02
9. Total MST Rem.
.29
.01
-.30
10. Total MST Story
.21
.01
-.23
Note. MST = mental-state talk. Rem. = Reminiscing.
*p <.05. **p <.01, one-tailed.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

—
-.26
.29
-.08
.01
-.19
-.03

—
.13
.29
-.01
.79**
.31

—
-.46**
-.14
.57**
-.45**

—
.08
-.04
.99**

—
-.18
.19

—
-.04

—
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Two one-way MANOVAs were performed to identify any gender differences in source
monitoring and mental-state talk before testing the main predictions. The first MANOVA
included source correct, “I did it” errors, and “You did it” errors as dependent variables given the
correlations amongst these three variables. Results showed that there was no significant
multivariate effect of gender in children’s source monitoring [Pillai’s Trace = .010, F (3, 29) =
0.094, p = .963, η2p = .010]. The second MANOVA included mother’s mental-state talk and
children’s mental-state talk in reminiscing, mother’s mental-state talk in storytelling, and total
mental-state talk (mother and child combined as one variable) in reminiscing, as well as in
storytelling as the dependent variables given the correlations amongst these variables. There was
no significant multivariate effect of gender in the amount of mental-state talk [Pillai’s Trace =
.212, F (5, 27) = 1.46, p = .237, η2p = .212]. Univariate independent one-way ANOVAs showed
a significant main effect for child gender with respect to children’s mental-state talk during
reminiscing, F (1, 31) = 4.51, p = 0.042, η2p = 0.127. Males had a greater proportion of mentalstate talk during reminiscing (M = .28, SE = .04) compared to females (M = .16, SE = .04).
Accurate recognition and children’s mental-state talk in the storybook activity were not entered
into either MANOVA given their lack of significant correlation with the other variables. Rather,
they were each entered in their own independent t-test to test child gender differences in these
variables. There was no significant difference between males and females in accurate
recognition, t (31) = .384, p = .703, d = .134, 95% CI [-.171, .250]. However, there was a
significant difference between genders in children’s mental-state talk in storytelling, t (24.16) = 2.38, p = .026, d = .824, CI [-.367, -.026], where females had a greater proportion of mental-state
talk in storytelling (M = .28, SD = .30) than males (M = .08, SD = .15). In conclusion, the gender
variable was not included in the main analyses given there were no significant multivariate
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effects of gender in source monitoring and mental-state talk. Generally, there was no impact of
gender on children’s combined source-monitoring performance, the proportion of mental-state
talk, or recognition, where males and females showed no significant differences. However, there
was an impact of gender with respect to children’s mental-state talk in reminiscing and
storytelling, where males had a greater proportion of talk than females during reminiscing, while
females had a greater proportion during storytelling than males.
Two one-way MANOVAs were also conducted to test for developmental differences
between the 3- and 4-year-old group and the 5- and 6-year-old group in source monitoring and
mental-state talk use before testing the main predictions. There were no predictions made about
this data and the age group variable was not used in the main analyses given there were no
multivariate effects. However, there was one instance where there was a significant difference in
age groups, which is reported below. The first MANOVA included source correct, “I did it”
errors, and “You did it” errors as dependent variables given the correlations amongst these
variables. There was no significant age effect in source monitoring [Pillai’s Trace = .053, F (3,
29) = .544, p = .656, η2p = .053]. The second MANOVA included mother’s mental-state talk and
children’s mental-state talk in reminiscing, mother’s mental-state talk in storytelling, and total
mental-state talk in reminiscing, as well as in storytelling as the dependent variables given the
correlations amongst these variables. There was no significant multivariate effect of age in the
use of mental-state talk [Pillai’s Trace = .168, F (5, 27) = 1.09, p = .389, η2p = .168]. Like before,
accurate recognition and children’s mental-state talk in the storybook activity were not entered
into either MANOVA given their lack of correlation with the other variables. Thus, they were
each entered in their own independent t-test to examine developmental differences in these
variables. There was a significant difference between ages in accurate recognition, t (31) = -4.73,
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p < 0.001, d = 1.64, 95% CI [-.537, -.213] where the 5- and 6-year-old group had a higher
proportion of accurate recognitions scores (M = .58, SD = .20) compared to the 3- and 4-year-old
group (M = .20, SD = .26). The proportion of children’s mental-state talk in the storybook
activity did not significantly differ between the two age groups, t (31) = -1.25, p = .222, d = .440,
CI [-.294, .071]. In sum, there was no impact of age (measured by two developmental periods)
on children’s source-monitoring performance or mental-state talk in reminiscing and storytelling.
There was however an impact of age on children’s recognition, where the older developmental
group (5- and 6-year-olds) had a greater proportion of accurate recognition scores compared to
the younger group (3- and 4-year-olds).
Main Analyses
A series of multiple regressions were conducted to examine the main study predictions.
For each outcome variable, four regressions were performed where the independent variables
were maternal mental-state talk and child mental-state talk used in reminiscing, maternal mentalstate talk and child mental-state talk used in storybook reading, the total proportion of mentalstate talk in reminiscing, and the total proportion of mental-state talk in storybook reading.
Regressions were conducted one-tailed since the predictions were hypothesizing a specific
direction of the associations.
Mental-State Talk in Reminiscing, Recognition, and Source Monitoring
Mother mental-state talk and child mental-state talk in reminiscing were regressed on
children’s accurate recognition to test the hypothesis that mental-state talk produced by motherchild dyads is positively associated with children’s accurate recognition. Accurate recognition,
children’s age in months, and vocabulary were all correlated, and thus this regression model was
conducted controlling for the effects of children’s age and vocabulary. The overall model was
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significant, F (4, 26) = 5.86, p = .001, and explained 47.4% of the variance in recognition (Adj.
R2 = .393). Two of the predictors significantly contributed to the model. Being older (ß = .655, p
= .004) and using a higher proportion of child mental-state talk (ß = .277, p = .038) were related
to greater accurate recognition (refer to Table 7). Total mental-state talk in reminiscing (mother
and child talk combined as one variable) was regressed on accurate recognition as well, while
controlling for children’s age in months and receptive vocabulary. The overall model accounted
for 38.5% of the variance in accurate recognition (Adj. R2 = .317). This model was significant, F
(3, 27) = 5.64, p = .002. Age was the only variable that significantly contributed to the model,
where being older was related to increased accurate recognition (ß = .486, p = .024) (refer to
Table 8).
Table 7
Regression in which mother mental-state talk in reminiscing and child mental-state talk in
reminiscing are regressed on children’s accurate recognition controlling for children’s age in
months and vocabulary
Variable
B
SE B
Step 1
Constant
-.393
.003
Child Age (months)
.014
.003
Step 2
Constant
-.416
.212
Child Age (months)
.012
.005
Vocab
.001
.003
Step 3
Constant
-.551
.219
Child Age (months)
.015
.005
Vocab
.001
.003
Mother MST Rem
-.564
.337
Child MST Rem
.490
.265
Note. MST = mental-state talk. Rem = Reminiscing.
* p <.05, **p <.01.
Table 8

β

R²

.598

.358

.517
.107

.363

.655**
.114
-.260
.277*

.474
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Regression in which total mental-state talk in reminiscing (mother and child combined) are
regressed on children’s accurate recognition controlling for children’s age in months and
vocabulary
Variable
B
SE B
Step 1
Constant
-.393
.203
Child Age (months)
.014
.003
Step 2
Constant
-.416
.212
Child Age (months)
.012
.005
Vocab
.001
.003
Step 3
Constant
-.322
.232
Child Age (months)
.011
.005
Vocab
.002
.003
Total MST Rem
-.515
.519
Note. MST = mental-state talk. Rem = Reminiscing.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

β

R²

.598

.358

.517
.107

.363

.486*
.174
-.157

.385

Mother mental-state talk and child mental-state talk in reminiscing were also individually
regressed on the source correct variable to test the hypothesis that mental-state talk produced by
mother-child dyads and source accuracy are positively associated. The overall model (mother
mental-state talk and child mental-state talk as the two factors) explained about 10.8% of the
variance in source accuracy (Adj. R2 = .048), which was not significant, F (2, 30) = 1.81, p =
.091. However, mother mental-state talk in reminiscing significantly contributed to the model
where a greater proportion of mental-state talk used by mothers was related to increased source
accuracy (ß = .311, p = .041) (refer to Table 9). This association was not evident for children’s
talk in reminiscing (p = .326). Additionally, total mental-state talk in reminiscing (mother and
child talk combined) was not associated to source accuracy (p = .076).
Table 9
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Regression in which mother mental-state talk and child mental-state talk in reminiscing are
regressed on children’s source accuracy
Variable
B
SE B
Constant
.489
.076
Mother MST Rem
.390
.217
Child MST Rem
.081
.177
Note. MST = mental-state talk. Rem = Reminiscing.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

β

R²

.311*
.079

.108

Finally, to test the hypothesis that mental-state talk produced by mother-child dyads is
positively related to “I did it” errors and negatively related to “You did it errors”, the mentalstate talk measures in reminiscing were regressed on both the “I did it” and “You did it” source
errors. When total mental-state talk in reminiscing (mother and child combined) was regressed
on the “You did it” error, the model explained about 10% of the variance in the “You did it”
errors (Adj. R2 = .071) and was significant, F (1, 31) = 3.44, p = .037. Higher proportions of total
mental-state talk in reminiscing (mother and child mental-state talk combined) were related to
children making fewer “You did it” errors (ß = -.316, p = .037) (refer to Table 10). However,
child mental-state talk and mother mental-state talk in reminiscing were not associated with “I
did it” errors or “You did it” errors, and total mental-state talk in reminiscing was not associated
with “I did it” errors, ps > .05.
Table 10
Regression in which total mental-state talk (mother and child combined) in reminiscing are
regressed on children’s “You did it” source errors
Variable
B
SE B
Constant
.692
.171
Total MST Rem
-1.154
.622
Note. MST = mental-state talk. Rem = Reminiscing.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

β

R²

-.316*

.100
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In conclusion, mental-state talk in reminiscing was a significant predictor of children’s
recognition and source-monitoring across some measures. For instance, mother mental-state talk
and child mental-state talk as factors in a model together predicted children’s accurate
recognition over and above the effects of children’s age in months and receptive vocabulary.
When mother and child mental-state talk were combined, they also predicted children’s accurate
recognition over and above children’s age and vocabulary. The proportion of mother’s mentalstate talk in reminiscing also independently contributed to children’s source accuracy, where
greater mental-state talk proportions were related to higher source accuracy. Finally, the total
proportion of mental-state talk in reminiscing did predict children’s “You did it” errors (see
Appendix F for all non-significant regression tables).
Mental-State Talk in Wordless Storytelling, Recognition, and Source Monitoring
Similar analyses were conducted to examine the main predictions with the measures of
mental-state talk during storytelling. Mother mental-state talk and child mental-state talk in
storytelling were regressed on children’s accurate recognition while controlling for the effects of
children’s age in months and vocabulary to test the hypothesis that mental-state talk produced by
mother-child dyads is positively associated with children’s accurate recognition. The overall
model was found to be significant, F (4, 26) = 3.77, p = .008 and explained about 36.7% of the
variance in recognition (Adj. R2 = .270). Age was the only variable that significantly contributed
to this model, where being older was related to increased accurate recognition (ß = .490, p =
.030) (refer to Table 11). Total mental-state talk in storytelling (mother and children combined as
one variable) was also regressed on accurate recognition, while controlling for children’s age in
months and vocabulary. The model accounted for 36.3% of the variance in recognition (Adj. R2
= .293), which was found to be significant, F (3, 27) = 5.14, p = .003. Again, age was the only
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variable that significantly contributed to the model, where being older was related to increased
accurate recognition (ß = .510, p = .021) (refer to Table 12).
Table 11
Regression in which mother mental-state talk in storytelling and child mental-state talk in
storytelling are regressed on children’s accurate recognition controlling for children’s age in
months and vocabulary
Variable
B
Step 1
Constant
-.393
Child Age (months)
.014
Step 2
Constant
-.416
Child Age (months)
.012
Vocab
.001
Step 3
Constant
-.381
Child Age (months)
.011
Vocab
.002
Mother MST Story
-.240
Child MST Story
.010
Note. MST = mental-state talk.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

SE B

β

R²

.203
.003

.598

.358

.212
.005
.003

.517
.107

.363

.234
.006
.003
.573
.182

.490*
.140
-.069
.009

.367

Table 12
Regression in which total mental-state talk in storytelling (mother and child combined) are
regressed on children’s accurate recognition controlling for children’s age in months and
vocabulary
Variable
Step 1
Constant
Child Age (months)
Step 2
Constant
Child Age (months)
Vocab
Step 3

B

SE B

β

R²

-.393
.014

.203
.003

.598

.358

-.416
.012
.001

.212
.005
.003

.517
.107

.363

MENTAL-STATE TALK AND SOURCE MONITORING
Constant
-.405
Child Age (months)
.012
Vocab
.001
Total MST Story
-.083
Note. MST = mental-state talk.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

.229
.005
.003
.571
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.510*
.117
-.023

.363

The hypotheses that mental-state talk produced by mother-child dyads is positively
related to source accuracy, positively related to “I did it” errors, and negatively related to “You
did it” errors were also tested by regressing mental-state talk measures in storytelling on source
correct, “I did it” errors, and “You did it” errors. Mother mental-state talk and child mental-state
talk in storytelling were not associated with source accuracy, “I did it” errors, or “You did it”
errors, ps > .05. Similarly, when total mental-state talk in storytelling (mother and child
combined as one variable) was regressed on these outcomes, there were no significant
associations, ps > .05.
In conclusion, mental-state talk in storytelling was a significant predictor of children’s
accurate recognition, but not children’s source-monitoring performance. Mother mental-state talk
and child mental-state talk as factors in a model were significant predictors of children’s
recognition over and above the effects of age in months and receptive vocabulary. Similarly,
when mother and child mental-state talk in storytelling were combined as a single factor, it was
also a significant predictor of children’s accurate recognition over and above the effects of age
and vocabulary (see Appendix F for all non-significant regression tables).
Exploratory Analyses
Data were collected on the type of mental-state talk (i.e., cognitive, desire, emotion,
modulation of assertion, and “other”) being used in reminiscing and storytelling. While no
predictions were made about the type of talk and how it was used in conversation, exploratory
analyses were conducted to examine potential differences in the proportions of types of mental-
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state talk collapsed across both storybook reading and reminiscing for both mother and children.
Two repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to explore these potential differences in the
types of mental-state talk. These analyses were conducted so that perhaps with these findings,
future research could examine how the types of mental-state talk might differentially relate to
children’s source monitoring.
The proportion of mother’s mental-state talk was first examined. Mauchly’s test indicated
that the assumption of sphericity was violated, X 2 (9) = 113.21, p < 0.001. As such, GreenhouseGeisser corrected tests are reported (ε = .48). There was a significant difference in the mothers’
proportion of mental-state talk across the five types of talk, F (1.94, 61.91) = 173.15, p < 0.001,
η2p = .844. Post hoc contrasts showed that there was a significantly greater proportion of
cognitive talk used by mothers compared to desire, emotion, modulation of assertion, and “other”
talk, ps < 0.001 (Table 13). Emotion and desire talk were not significantly different (p = .126);
however, they were both proportionately and significantly greater compared to modulation of
assertion and “other” talk, ps < 0.05. Further, mothers’ modulation of assertion talk was
significantly greater than their “other” talk, p < 0.001 (Table 13).
As for the proportion of children’s mental-state talk across the five types, Mauchly’s test
also indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated, X 2 (9) = 121.33, p < 0.001. As
such, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests are reported (ε = .46). There was a significant
difference in the children’s proportion of mental-state talk across the five types of talk, F (1.85,
59.11) = 57.57, p < 0.001, η2p = .643. Post hoc contrasts showed that children like their mothers
used a significantly greater proportion of cognitive talk compared to desire, emotion, modulation
of assertion and “other” talk, ps < 0.001 (Table 13). The amount of desire and emotion talk were
significantly greater than “other” talk, ps < 0.001. Yet, there were no differences between
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children’s use of desire and emotion talk (p = 1.00), their desire and modulation of assertion talk
(p = .151), their emotion and modulation of assertion talk (p = .373), or their modulation of
assertion and “other” talk (p = .078) (Table 13).
Overall, these exploratory analyses illustrate that there is a difference in the type of
mental-state talk mothers and children are using throughout reminiscing and storytelling. For
instance, both mothers and children are using cognitive terms proportionally more than desire,
emotion, modulation of assertion, or “other” terms. Further, “other” terms appear to be the least
commonly type of mental-state talk while employing mental-state talk during conversations.
Table 13
Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges of Mother and Children’s Mental-State Talk for Each
Type of Talk
Variable
n
M
SD
Mother Cognitive Talk
33
.58
.13
Mother Desire Talk
33
.14
.10
Mother Emotion Talk
33
.20
.09
Mother MOA Talk
33
.07
.05
Mother “Other” Talk
33
.01
.02
Child Cognitive Talk
33
.66
.28
Child Desire Talk
33
.17
.24
Child Emotion Talk
33
.10
.15
Child MOA Talk
33
.04
.09
Child “Other” Talk
33
.00
.00
Note. MOA = Modulation of Assertion. All scores are proportional values.

Range
.38-.88
.00-.40
.03-.36
.00-.18
.00-.06
.00-1.00
.00-1.00
.00-.50
.00-.33
.00-.00

Discussion
The purpose of the study was to employ a socio-linguistic approach and examine the
relationship between mental-state talk during parent-child interactions and children’s source
monitoring. Monitoring source is a difficult task, and young children especially tend to
misattribute information to the wrong source (Brubacher et al., 2011; Roberts, 2002). However,
having the capacity to monitor source is an important skill as it influences the development of
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our knowledge base, who we choose to trust and view as a reliable source, and how we think
about past life events. Many studies have illustrated maturational and neurological impacts on
source monitoring (Earhart & Roberts, 2014; Hala et al., 2016; Roberts et al., 2016), but the role
of language in the home and theory-of-mind understanding on source monitoring has emerged as
another potential factor. Parents are often children’s first linguistic partners and scaffold
children’s understanding of the past, placing the parental interactional style as a worthy avenue
to explore in the development of source-monitoring skills. Thus, the current findings provided
some initial empirical support for the relationship between parental-interactional style measured
by mother and child mental-state talk and children’s ability to monitor source.
The findings partially supported models of mental-state reasoning and theories of
learning and offer novel evidence that theory of mind reflected by mental-state talk use and
exposure may be central to children’s ability to monitor source. Specifically, findings reveal that
a greater proportion of mental-state talk produced by mother-child dyads during parent-child
reminiscing and storytelling is related to accurate item recognition, while a greater proportion of
mother-child mental-state talk during reminiscing is related to increased source accuracy. The
current findings also offered some partial support about the relationship between mental-state
talk and source confusions. To illustrate and situate these findings, first the associations between
mental-state talk and children’s item recognition (i.e., could children remember which items
were part of the farm game) are discussed. Then, the findings pertaining to the relationship
between mental-state talk and source accuracy (i.e., could children identify the source of each
action in the farm game) are discussed. Further, the type of source confusions such as the “I did
it” error and the “You did it” error are discussed with respect to their association to mental-state
talk. Given that the current study explored the use of mother-child mental-state talk in both
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reminiscing and storytelling, the differences in mental-state talk between these two contexts and
its association to source monitoring will also be discussed. Finally, the limitations of the current
study and important practical implications are reviewed. To conclude, the final paragraph
summarizes the importance of this investigation and suggestions for future directions.
Mental-State Talk and Recognition
Perspectives from the mental-state reasoning model suggested that having an awareness
of the origins of knowledge such as knowing how someone came to learn information or
recognizing conflicting mental states should scaffold an understanding of what is involved in
remembering details from the past (Rudek & Haden, 2005; Welch-Ross, 2000). Aligning with
this model, it was expected that mental-state talk produced by mother-child dyads would be
positively related to children’s recognition of items in the farm animal game. This prediction was
developed because mental-state talk in parent-child interactions should assist children in
constructing detailed and specific narratives of past events, including accurately recalling
previous objects from an activity (Fivush, 2006). This suggestion is consistent with the findings
of the current study where using mental-state talk during parent-child interactions was related to
children more accurately recognizing items they have previously engaged with. In this way, as a
greater proportion of mental-state talk produced by mother-child dyads was used in both
reminiscing and storytelling, children’s recognition of animals in the farm game was more
accurate. Mental-state talk was associated with correct recognition regardless of whether mother
mental-state talk, child mental-state talk, or the combined proportion of mother and child mentalstate talk was used to index the amount of mental-state talk in the parent-child interaction.
Further, the association remained significant even after controlling for children’s age in months
and their receptive vocabulary. However, only the child’s use of mental-state talk in reminiscing
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independently contributed to their recognition scores. That is, children that used a greater
proportion of mental-state terms while reminiscing about past events was related to children
recognizing a greater proportion of items that were in the farm activity. These findings were
consistent with previous literature which illustrated how children who can consider multiple
knowledge states, which could be acquired through exposure to mental-state talk (Bartsch &
Wellman, 1995), should be capable of considering multiple memories and making detailed
accounts of past events (Fivush, 2006), and thus and will show accurate recognition of both new
and old items during retrieval (Welch-Ross, 2000).
There are a couple of theoretical reasons why the use of mental-state talk might be related
to children’s accurate recognition in the current study. Firstly, mental-state talk during
interactions could scaffold children’s understanding of the connection between knowledge and
experience (i.e., how you came to know the information you know). In other words, recognizing
that someone may be more informed about something if they had a direct experience with it
would indicate an understanding that knowledge and experience are connected (Whitcombe &
Robinson, 2000). Building this connection might facilitate the accurate recognition of items
children have engaged with in a past encounter (Welch-Ross, 2000) because mental-state talk
directs the speaker and listener to knowledge states, beliefs, or desires of others (Reese &
Cleveland, 2006). During a game, a child might be able to remember which items were present
because they had a direct experience with them and their understanding about mental states
allows them to connect mental states with a direct experience, and thus they are attuned to
thinking about past experiences in a meaningful way. Secondly, mental-state talk exposes
children to dialogue that includes different perspectives and thus helps children to reason about
conflicting representations of the mind (Tompkins et al., 2018). Then, with more exposure to
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mental-state talk children might have the cognitive capacity to hold both new and old and
potentially conflicting memories in their working memory and compare them to evaluate what
they engaged with during a previous event (Roberts, 2002). Together, the findings suggested that
the quality of parent-child interactions measured by the proportion of mental-state talk during the
interaction may contribute to children’s memory and specifically their ability to accurately
recognize items that were presented to them in the past.
Mental-State Talk and Source Monitoring
The current findings also illuminated some novel evidence about the relationship between
mental-state talk and source accuracy. Aligning with the hypothesis that mental-state talk
produced by mother-child dyads would be positively associated with source accuracy, mother’s
mental-state talk in reminiscing independently related to children’s ability to distinguish between
themselves and their mother as the source of the action during the farm activity, although this
effect was small. Specifically, a greater proportion of mental-state terms from the mother during
reminiscing was related to increased accuracy in children’s source decisions. This finding
extends the previous research about the mental-state reasoning model in which children who can
reason about multiple mental states which is an indicator of theory-of-mind understanding should
be able to also consider multiple sources of information (Roberts, 2002). Further, this finding is
consistent with research by Reese and colleagues (2020) and reinforced Vygotskian theory by
demonstrating the importance of parent-child reminiscing. Parent-child reminiscing helps to
expose children to conversations about the mind and scaffolds children’s ability to process and
understand past events (Tamopeau & Ruffman, 2006; Tompkins et al., 2018). For instance, talk
about mental states during reminiscing might help to bring awareness to where information and
knowledge originate from. Specifically, mothers using mental-state talk are exposing their

MENTAL-STATE TALK AND SOURCE MONITORING

66

children to details of an event beyond the basic facts by including details like knowledge states,
thoughts, beliefs, and desires. In this way, mental-state talk is facilitating children’s theory of
mind and assisting them in considering different sources of knowledge which might aid in their
ability to distinguish between different agents of information.
However, contrary to expectation, the other measures of mental-state talk in both
storytelling and reminiscing were not associated with children’s source accuracy. Specifically,
the measure of child mental-state talk in reminiscing, the combined proportion of child and
mother mental-state talk in reminiscing, child mental-state talk in storytelling, mother mentalstate talk in storytelling, and the combined proportion of child and mother mental-state talk in
storytelling accounted for a small proportion of the variance in children’s ability to correctly
identify the source of the actions in the farm activity. In this way, the findings did not show
strong support for the hypothesis that mental-state talk and source accuracy are strongly related.
These findings are inconsistent with perspectives about the mental-state reasoning model and
source monitoring. For instance, Bright-Paul et al. (2008) demonstrated a link between theoryof-mind understanding and source accuracy. They suggested that children who could consider
conflicting mental representations and recognize connections between knowledge and experience
can make more accurate source decisions. Evans and Roberts (2009) also found a relationship
between children’s understanding of mental states and source monitoring, where children who
could identify the source of information also showed an increased understanding about the
knowledge-experience connection and conflicting mental representations. Previous research has
also illustrated relationships between mental-state talk and other higher order functioning skills
(e.g., executive functioning) that assist in children’s ability to think flexibly about information or
knowledge states (Baptista et al., 2017). However, most of the findings presented in the current
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study were not consistent with the claim that mental-state talk helps children to think flexibly
about information sources.
There are a few possible explanations for the lack of association between mental-state
talk and source monitoring in the current study. Firstly, the type of source-monitoring task that
was employed in the current study might not have required the same level of theory-of-mind
understanding that previous studies did, and thus children were relying on other cognitive
abilities to make source decisions. For instance, previous research that examined associations
between theory-of-mind understanding and source monitoring have not used a collaborative
reality-monitoring source task (Bright-Paul et al., 2008; Evans & Roberts, 2009) similar to the
one employed in the current study. Rather, they used external sources such as two external
informants where participants had to determine who had access to information, and the theoryof-mind tasks administered measured a similar level of mental-state understanding that would
have been needed in the source-monitoring activities (e.g., tasks that examined children’s
understanding of connecting experience to knowledge). In this way, the ability to monitor source
has different levels of cognitive capacity, meaning that cognitive skills such as theory-of-mind
which are sometimes required to monitor sources on one task might not be as generalizable to
other source-monitoring tasks (Johnson et al., 1993).
Secondly, in the current study children’s theory of mind was inferred through children’s
use of and exposure to mental-state talk. Alternatively, previous studies employed a direct
measurement of theory-of-mind and understanding of mental states to examine associations to
source monitoring. Perhaps, the children in the current study did not have an advanced
understanding of mental states yet so that their own use of mental-state talk was simply echoic of
the parents’ use, rather than employing it to convey a sophisticated theory-of-mind
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understanding (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). This suggestion is supported by previous literature
surrounding language development which highlights that over the course of the preschool years,
children’s understanding of how language is used to communicate is still developing (Siegler et
al., 2014). As such, during this developmental period children might not have yet grasped the
actual meaning of the language they are using during a conversation. Therefore, children’s use of
mental-state talk did not reflect a capacity to understand different knowledge states or sources of
information, and thus this measure was not related to their source accuracy.
In sum, the current findings offer a novel insight between mental-state talk and children’s
source accuracy, suggesting that mothers’ mental-state talk during times of discussing past
events impacted children’s growing understanding of the past and their ability to consider
multiple sources of information. However, while a novel finding, taken together, the results
should be interpreted with caution due to the nonsignificant associations found between the other
measures of mental-state talk and source accuracy.
Mental-State Talk and Source Confusions
With regards to source confusions during the source-monitoring activity, it was expected
that mental-state talk produced by mother-child dyads would positively relate to “I did it” errors,
and negatively relate to “You did it” errors. During a collaborative task, having theory-of-mind
skills is critical for a child to take on the perspective of their partner’s and internalize their
actions (Foley & Ratner, 1998). Thus, when later asked about the activity, children who have the
capacity to take on the perspective of others may claim undue responsibility for the actions
performed during the activity (i.e., “I did it” errors) because they internalized the partner’s
actions as their own. The current findings showed partial support for this hypothesis, particularly
during reminiscing, because the combined proportion of mother and child mental-state talk
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measure was associated with the proportion of “You did it” errors but not, surprisingly, the
proportion of “I did it” errors. This finding is surprising given that source errors were separated
into either one of these types of errors, and thus making fewer “You did it” errors should indicate
making more “I did it” errors. The proportion of “You did it” errors illustrate the tendency for
children to claim their mother had picked a farm animal in the activity when later asked to make
a source decision, although it was the child who picked the item (i.e., the opposite of making an
“I did it” error). Indeed, in the current study, a greater proportion of mental-state talk (mother
and child combined) was related to children making fewer “You did it” source confusions,
although this mental-state talk measure accounted for a small proportion of the variance.
Theories of the appropriation bias presented by Foley and colleagues suggested that when
children work on a collaborative task with someone, they will anticipate and internalize their
partner’s actions (Foley & Ratner, 1998). As a result, when later asked about who performed an
action, children might take undue responsibility for their partner’s actions because they are
activating previous thoughts about anticipating the partner’s actions and self-recording them as
their own (Foley & Ratner, 1998). Research suggests that this pattern occurs when children can
take on the perspective of their partner (Ratner et al., 2002), and has been illustrated in research
on the appropriation bias (Foley et al., 1993; Ford et al., 2011; Ratner et al., 2002). In the current
study, children made fewer “You did it” errors when a greater proportion of mental-state talk
(mother and child combined) was used during reminiscing. When children made source errors,
they could make either “I did it” or “You did it” errors, and thus fewer “You did it” errors could
possibly suggest that children were making more “I did it” errors when more mental-state terms
were used during reminiscing. However, hypothesizing that mental-state talk and “I did it” errors
are positively related was not empirically supported as no significant associations were found; it
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is inconsistent with previous findings about theory-of-mind understanding and the appropriation
bias (Barreto et al., 2017; Ratner et al., 2002). As such, these findings demonstrated limited
consistency with previous research about the appropriation bias but suggest that we need a more
nuanced understanding of the exact relation between source monitoring and appropriation.
There might be some possible explanations for these findings. First, mental-state talk was
related to making fewer “You did it” errors, which might be an indication that children are
making fewer errors overall when more mental-state talk is being used during reminiscing. This
finding is more congruent with the mental-state reasoning model which posits that understanding
how to attribute mental states to we and others might allow children to consider multiple sources
while making source decisions because they have developed an understanding to reason about
differing knowledge states (Evans & Roberts, 2009). In this way, theory of mind is central to
source-monitoring skills and may be reflected by using or being exposed to talk about mental
states. As such, the exposure and use of mental-state talk would help children make more
accurate source decisions and fewer source confusions. Alternatively, we might not have seen a
significant association between mental-state talk and “I did it” errors because, like the source
accuracy findings, the children’s mental-state understanding has not reached an abstract level to
internalize and recode others’ actions as their own during a collaborative task. Indeed, children’s
theory-of-mind understanding (i.e., an understanding of mental states beyond their own) is
developing between the ages of 3 and 5 years (Siegler et al., 2014), yet it may not be until after
age five that they can use this social-cognitive understanding to facilitate their own learning from
others. As illustrated by theories of learning and the appropriation bias literature, this learning is
facilitated during a collaborative activity when children can take on the perspective of their
partner and learn from their actions (Foley & Ratner, 1998). However, when this learning is
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occurring, it takes priority over making correct source decisions. Reflecting on the current
findings, while children may have used and been exposed to mental-state talk, it might not have
been enough to strengthen their theory-of-mind to provide them with the cognitive capacity to
internalize the actions of others and claim them as their own. As a result, mental-state talk
produced by mother-child dyads was not related to children making “I did it” errors. Taken
together, the findings illustrated some nuanced evidence that theory of mind reflected by mentalstate talk might impact children’s source confusions during a collaborative task, yet additional
research should be done with older age groups to understand if having a more developed
understanding of mental states will result in a tendency to make more “I did it” source
confusions.
Reminiscing Versus Storytelling
While predictions were not made about the differences between the use of mental-state
talk in reminiscing and storytelling or the associations between mental-state talk and source
monitoring across different contexts, there was a noticeably greater proportion of mental-state
talk (mother and child combined) used during reminiscing compared to storytelling. Further,
there were mixed findings between mental-state talk and source monitoring across reminiscing
and storytelling. Given the benefits of mental-state talk for children’s growing understanding of
the mind, it might be worthy to consider the current findings together and discuss possible
explanations for contextual differences when mental-state talk is used.
The current findings extended previous research on using mental-state language across
different contexts and offers additional empirical support that this language may vary according
to context. For instance, Howe et al. (2010) found that mothers used more cognitive terms or
engaged in discussion about goals while discussing positive events in their home compared to
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when interacting over a set of pictures. Further, Drummond et al. (2014) highlighted how parents
labelled emotions and mental states more often while reading a story than while joint playing, yet
they used mental-state language such as “think” and “know” more often during joint play.
Parents might have different goals across contexts such as teaching children about feelings or
emotions, or having their child reflect on their own mental state. Thus, parents target their
interactional approaches to the context such as using different types of mental-state talk in
storytelling versus joint play or reminiscing (Drummond et al., 2014).
In the current study, we see how the context where mental-state talk is used might
differentially impact child development outcomes. Mothers’ use of mental-state talk in
reminiscing was related to children’s ability to monitor source and children’s mental-state talk in
reminiscing also independently contributed to recognition. However, these patterns were not
found for mental-state talk in storytelling. During reminiscing, parents might be interested in
providing an opportunity for their child to express their emotions, share their perspective of an
event, and reflect on their own mental states (Lawson et al., 2021). Addressing these goals in
reminiscing might foster children’s ability to construct a coherent narrative of past events.
Specifically, given that reminiscing is typically more emotionally charging than discussing
characters in a storybook, children become more equipped to think, talk about, and represent
emotional experiences from different perspectives during reminiscing, all of which might lead to
increased memory accuracy, and the ability to consider multiple sources of information (Lawson
et al., 2021). In a different manner, during storytelling children are not required to practice selfawareness of their own mental states because parents and children will most often comment on
the emotions or knowledge states of characters in the story (Drummond et al., 2014). Further,
they will comment on what is explicitly occurring in the story, rather than consider past events or
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memories of the characters. In this way, children might not be reflecting on their own mental
states and thus will lack the capacity to reason about or consider differing perspectives of past
events and multiple sources of information.
Mental-state talk in reminiscing might have been more influential on monitoring source
compared to mental-state talk used while reading a wordless storybook in the current study given
the nature of the source-monitoring task. Children worked with their parent during the sourcemonitoring activity and might have reflected on both their parents’ and their own mental
experience of the activity and the actions. Similarly, during the reminiscing activity, children and
their parent discussed events they were both involved in, and thus children might have been more
aware of how to reflect on past events while thinking about their own mental states or of people
they were familiar with (Drummond et al., 2014). In contrast, in the storybook activity mentalstate talk could have been used to reflect only on the mental states of characters. While learning
to take the perspective of others is an indication of mental-state understanding between 3 and 5
years of age (Siegler et al., 2014), the collaborative nature of the source-monitoring activity
required children to reflect on their own knowledge state and their partner’s simultaneously
while considering the source of each action. As a result, perhaps the degree of understanding of
mental states used during storytelling was not congruent with the level of mental-state
understanding children had to demonstrate while monitoring source in this particular sourcemonitoring task.
Overall, the current study illustrated some differences between the tasks used to elicit
mental-state talk. Particularly, mental-state talk in reminiscing might have a greater impact on
source monitoring compared to storytelling given the interactional goals involved in reminiscing
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and their connection to children’s understanding of the past and where information comes from
(Lawson et al., 2021; Rudek & Haden, 2005).
Limitations
The results of the current study should be interpreted with a few limitations in mind.
First, the sample size was small (n = 33) for the type of models the current study was examining
and was particularly lower compared to other studies of this nature (e.g., Baptista et al., 2017). A
lower sample size could limit retaining sufficient power of .80 because sample size and statistical
power are correlated. If there is low power, it could result in not detecting a significant effect
when there truly is one (i.e., a Type II error; Mayers, 2013). The sample was also compiled of
mainly Canadian, white, middle-class participants and as a result, this sample could limit the
ability to generalize the findings to other samples with different demographics. Further,
participants needed access to the internet and electronic devices for participation, and thus if
families who were interested did not have access to internet, computers, or tablets, these
requirements could have potentially limited their ability to volunteer for participation. Future
studies with a larger sample, and a more diverse demographic of participants are needed to
replicate the current study.
Second, the format in which the source-monitoring task was administered could limit the
generalization of these findings to similar study designs. Given the tasks in the sourcemonitoring activity were carried out on a virtual platform, children could only cognitively
engage by deciding about which animals they wanted to pick and verbalizing that to the
researcher. However, they could not physically interact with the items. For example, there were
no settings that could be adjusted in the virtual meeting to allow the participants to physically
interact with the farm animals (e.g., having control on their device to move the items
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themselves). In this way, the lack of physical engagement in the activity might have limited
children’s capacity to generate their own actions and thus they were less likely to remember who
picked each item. This limitation falls under the theory of the self-generation effect, which
proposes that actively engaging with new material or generating our own action is remembered
better compared to passively learning information such as watching an action or reading material
(Bertsch et al., 2007; Slamecka & Graf, 1978). As a result, these findings cannot address possible
relationships amongst mental-state talk and source monitoring in a format that allows children to
actively interact with the items (e.g., in-person sessions or having remote control access during a
virtual session to click and drag the animals into the barn themselves). Future directions should
consider replicating this study in another format to understand if the self-generation effect could
have impacted the children’s source decisions in the current study. Alternatively, while children
could cognitively participate by thinking about and vocalizing which animals they wanted to
pick, perhaps reflecting on these actions required abstract reasoning about mental states and
actions that was above the children’s cognitive developmental level, in which making source
decisions about the farm animals was more difficult. Thus, additional research should also
consider replicating this study design with an older age group to understand if the self-generation
effect is most prominent with younger children for source monitoring.
Next, the study was cross-sectional in nature and only a single time point was accessed to
assess mental-state talk. In this way, the current study cannot speak to the absolute direction of
the current relationships, nor how parents may use mental-state talk across different situations or
events (e.g., during free play, supper time, or while discussing more negative past events) and
how these differences impact children’s ability to monitor source. Thus, future longitudinal
research is required to confirm the directionality of these associations. Also, an experimental
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design where a group of parents are taught how to use mental-state talk while interacting
compared to an active control group might help to assess the impact of mental-state talk on
source monitoring. Further, future directions might consider examining differences between
stimuli that elicit mental-state talk (e.g., free play vs. storytelling) and their effect on source
monitoring to understand if source-monitoring skills are impacted by the way mental-state talk is
used across contexts.
Practical Implications
Despite these limitations, this study introduces a new process that could potentially
complement the established literature on the current processes in source monitoring by adding
knowledge about the everyday socio-linguistic mechanisms at play such as the importance of
parental-interactional style in children’s understanding of how to monitor source. To this end,
more research in this area may help to develop better parenting practices regarding how children
process different sources of information. For instance, parents can scaffold their children’s talk
about mental states (Tompkins et al., 2018), and thus interventions for parents targeted at
teaching skills for discussing past events, mental states, and knowledge sources with their
children might consider source-monitoring skills as a potential outcome.
These results might also inform educational practices with respect to how sourcemonitoring skills can facilitate learning. When source-monitoring skills are improved, learning is
facilitated because now children will understand the sources of the information, and thus they
can build a reliable knowledge base (Evans & Roberts, 2009). Moving forward, when students
expand their mental-state understanding, they can use this social-cognitive skill to take on the
perspective of those around them during a collaborative activity (e.g., while working with
another student or group in the classroom). This perspective-taking allows students to foster their
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own learning by internalizing others’ actions, rather than focusing on who was the source of an
action during collaboration. Essentially, there is a need to investigate processes that impact
children’s ability to monitor source given the important implications for parenting and
educational practices. Fortunately, the research presented here illustrated a potential sociolinguistic mechanism that may help develop an ability to consider multiple sources of
information attached to events in the past.
Conclusion
This study added empirical evidence to support the growing body of literature
investigating the development of children’s source-monitoring skills. Taken together, these
findings outlined the current relationships between mental-state talk, recognition, and sourcemonitoring. Mental-state talk produced by mother-child dyads in both reminiscing and
storytelling appeared to impact children’s recognition of items, yet the relationship between
mental-state talk, source accuracy, and the type of source confusions across reminiscing and
storytelling was less evident. However, there are some promising findings that showed a positive
association between mothers’ use of mental-state talk in reminiscing and children’s source
accuracy. Future research is required to further explore these associations, especially in a larger
sample, to draw stronger conclusions.
With emerging research outlining the role of language and mental-state understanding in
source monitoring, parental-interactional styles are important processes to consider while
examining children’s ability to monitor source. Parents are central to children’s language
development and understanding of mental states. Additional research in this area such as
examining alternative parental-interactional styles could inform parenting practices about which
parent-child interaction practices are beneficial in children’s source-monitoring decisions.
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Overall, given the risk for and negative implications of children producing source confusions,
assessing the mechanisms conducive to the development of source monitoring is important for
children’s academic, social, and cognitive success.
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Appendix A
Welcome Scripts and Consent/Assent
Session 1: About today’s games slide
Today, we are going to play for about 50-60 minutes. In this session, we will talk about
fun memories and read a story! And we will also play some games! The games today are to help
me learn about what you know! There are no wrong answers! For the first two activities, I want
to hear from both of you! But, Mom (name), since I want to learn about what child (name)
knows, when we play the one-on-one games, I ask that you let child (name) answer. Throughout
the session today, if either of you need anything please let me know or if you didn’t hear what I
said, please let me know and I will repeat it! All of the activities and games today will be screen
recorded. I am going to start the recording now. Is that okay with you?
Session 2: About today’s games slide
Today, we are going to play for about 20-25 minutes. In this session, we will talk about
the farm game you played and play some games! The games today are to help me learn about
what you know! There are no wrong answers! Again, Mom (name), since I want to learn about
what child (name) knows, when we play the one-on-one games, I ask that you let child (name)
answer. Throughout the session today, if either of you need anything please let me know or if
you didn’t hear what I said, please let me know and I will repeat it! All of the activities and
games today will be screen recorded. I am going to start the recording now. Is that okay with
you?
Verbal Consent/Assent Slide
Mom (name), can you see the text on the screen about verbal consent? At this time, if you
give your consent, can you please read out loud this text and fill in the blanks?
Today is [today’s date].
My name is [name].
I give consent for myself and my child [child’s name] to participate in the study.
I understand that we are being screen recorded and I understand that I or my child may stop
participation at any time.
Assent
Hi (child’s name)!
(First visit): I am really excited to meet you! I am really interested in learning about the
words that you know and what you can remember about things. I was hoping that you could help
me learn about these things today. I have a few fun games that you get to do with your mom,
where you get to talk about fun memories and listen to a story! I also have some fun games that
we can play today. Would you like to do these things with us? The choice is completely up to
you! (wait for response).
Remember, playing these activities is up to you and no one will be upset if you don’t
want to play, or if you change your mind and want to stop. You can ask any questions you want;
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you can take a break if you need to – just tell me or your mom, or you can stop playing at any
time for any reason. Do you understand/does this sound good/okay?
(Second visit): It is great to see you again! I am excited to see you because you helped
me so much last time with learning about words and how you remember things! I need your help
again to remember how we played with the farm animals in their barn the last time I saw you. I
was wondering if you can help me remember. Can I ask you a few questions about the farm
animal game you played with your mom? Remember, your choice to help is up to you and no
one will be upset if you don’t want to, or if you change your mind and want to stop. You can ask
any questions you want; you can take a break if you need to – just tell me or your mom, or you
can stop playing at any time for any reason. Do you understand/does this sound good/okay?
Recognition of Colours (first session)
We’re going to play a quick game to warm-up your brain. I will show you some squares and
I want you to tell me the colour of the square.
- [Show yellow square] What colour is this square?
- [Show red square] What colour is this square?
- [Show green square] What colour is this square?
- [Show blue square] What colour is this square?
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Appendix B
Joint Reminiscing and Wordless Storybook Scripts
Frog Story
The first/next activity is to read a storybook! The cool thing about this book is that it has
no words, so you get to makeup the story only using pictures and characters. Child (name), your
mom is going to tell the story to you! So, I want you to put on your listening ears. Mom (her
name), I will click through the pages for you at the pace you are telling the story and I want you
to use the pictures on the screen to tell a story to your child (name). The book is about a boy, a
frog, and a dog. Child (name), would you like to name the frog that will be in the story? Before
you begin, I will click through some of the slides first so you can get an idea of what the story
looks like and then you can start! (click through first few slides). Okay, now Mom (name),
whenever you are read you can begin telling the story to your child (name).
Joint Reminiscing
1. Repeated event
The first/next activity is to talk about fun memories! The first memory I want you to talk
about is a specific time from an event that happens more than once. For example, you should talk
about what specifically happened at this specific instance of this event, rather than what you
usually do. Mom (name), can you tell me the event you chose for this topic? (pause for mom to
list the event) Nice! Now child and mom (names), let’s see how much you can remember about
the time “event example”. Try and remember every detail from the time “event example” and try
not to leave anything out. Please talk about this event in the most natural and comfortable way
for you, and you can start whenever you are ready!
2. Only Once
The next memory I want you to talk about is an event that you both shared and experienced
just once. In other words, I want you to share something you did together that was unique, not
routine, and only happened once. Mom (name), can you tell me the event you chose for this
topic? (pause for mom to list the event) Nice! Now child and mom (names), let’s see how much
you can remember about “event example”. Try and remember every detail from “event example”
and try not to leave anything out. Please talk about this event in the most natural and comfortable
way for you, and you can start whenever you are ready!
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Appendix C
Predetermined List of Mental-State Terms
Utterance Categories
Cognitive (includes
thought/belief/know)

Desire

Emotion/Feeling

Modulation of Assertion

Other

Example of Terms
Think, know, believe, expect, wonder, remember,
imagine, forget, guess, pretend, understand,
mean, assure, concentrate, distract, figure, idea,
ignore, interest, learn, recognize, trust, thought,
knew
Want, dream, hope, wish, prefer, keen on, care
(about), afraid (that), desire, need, missing
someone, would like, would love,
Happy, sad, unhappy, feel (e.g. feel bad/feel
good), cross, angry, grumpy, scared, afraid,
disappointed, worry, upset, surprise, pleased,
enjoy, excited, fun, interested, frustrated, missed,
annoyed, hurtful/hurt, bored, fed up, hate, love,
like (I like you), sorry, frightened, mad, dislike,
glad, fear, disgust, proud
Might, maybe, perhaps, possibly, probably, could
be, must, certainly, definitely, sure, guess, figure,
reckon, suppose, wonder, expect, curious, bet
remind, realize, consider, have in mind,
daydream, dream (when asleep)

Overlap
Terms
Expect,
wonder, guess,
figure, interest

Dream, like,
love, miss (ing,
ed), afraid
Interest (ed),
like, love, miss
(ing, ed),
afraid

Expect,
wonder, guess,
figure
Dream, dream
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Appendix D
Source-Monitoring Activity and Source Questioning Scripts and Items
First session: Farm construction
You and your mom are going to play a game together now! It is a really fun game about
farm animals. I am going to show you a picture of an empty barn. But oh no, there are no
animals in the barn! I really need your help to move the farm animals into the barn so they can be
warm and cozy. Do you think you can help do that? Great!
To play the game, you and your mom are going to take turns picking a farm animal and
telling it to go into the barn. Can you see all of the farm animals? When it is your turn, I want
you to pick an animal and tell me what you picked! Then I need your help to move the animal
into the barn. You can use your words to tell the animal to go into the barn. It might be fun to
make the farm animal sound too! Do you think you can do that? Great! After your turn, your
mom will also pick a farm animal on her own and help me move it into the barn!
I will show you how to play. Watch me and when it is your turn, I want you to do it just
like I did! Remember to take turns with your mom and to tell the farm animal to move into the
barn!
Farm Animals
-cow
-pig
-turkey
-lamb
-mouse
-deer
-chicken
-duck
-cat
-donkey
-dog
-owl
-peacock
-bunny
-frog
-goat
-horse

Version 1 Distractors
-Mouse
-Lamb
-Cat
-Horse
-Frog

Version 2 Distractors
-Goat
-Bunny
-Turkey
-Donkey
-Cow

Second Session: Source questions
Do you remember the farm animal game you and your mom played? Remember, in the
game you each got to pick animals to move into the barn, and sometimes you picked the animal
and sometimes your mom picked the animal. Now, I want to see if you can remember the
animals that went into the barn and I will ask you some questions about the animals. When you
see an animal that was in the farm game, I want you to tell me that it was in the game. But when
you see an animal that was not in the farm game, I want you to tell me that it was not in the
game. Some of the animals I show you will be the ones you picked. And some of the animals I
show you will be the ones your mom picked. I will also show you animals that neither you or
your mom picked. So, I want you to think really hard about the animals in the game and who
picked which animal. Does that sound okay? Great! Let's practice first to make sure you know
how to play the game!
Asking the Source Questions
- Animal was presented on the screen when it was being asked about
ORDER A
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1. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did you pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did your mom pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
2. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did your mom pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did you pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
3. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did you pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did your mom pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
4. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did your mom pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did you pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
5. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did you pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did your mom pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
6. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did your mom pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did you pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
7. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did you pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did your mom pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
8. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did your mom pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did you pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
9. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did you pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did your mom pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
10. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did your mom pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did you pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
11. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did you pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did your mom pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
12. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did your mom pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did you pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
13. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did you pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did your mom pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
14. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did your mom pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did you pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
15. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did you pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did your mom pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
16. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”

93

MENTAL-STATE TALK AND SOURCE MONITORING
“Did your mom pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did you pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
17. “Was the [animal] in the farm game that you played with your mom?”
- “Did you pick the [animal] to go into the barn or did your mom pick the
[animal] to go into the barn?”
-

ORDER B
• Order B was the same as Order A except children were first asked if their mom picked
the animal to go into the barn, rather than asking first if the child picked the animal
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Appendix E
PowerPoint Slides of Activities
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Example page from the wordless storybook.

Example of PPVT-4 screen.

96

Source-monitoring activity: Farm construction

Example of source questioning screen.
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Appendix F
Non-significant Regression Tables for Main Analyses
Table F1
Regression in which total mental-state talk in reminiscing (mother and child combined) are
regressed on children’s source accuracy
Variable
B
SE B
β
Constant
.494
.090
Total MST Rem
.484
.329
.256
Note. MST = mental-state talk. Rem = Reminiscing.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

R²
.065

Table F2
Regression in which mother mental-state talk and child mental-state talk in reminiscing are
regressed on children’s “You did it” source errors
Variable
B
SE B
β
Constant
.676
.145
Mother MST Rem
-.646
.412
-.268
Child MST Rem
-.444
.336
-.226
Note. MST = mental-state talk. Rem = Reminiscing.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

R²

.133

Table F3
Regression in which mother mental-state talk and child mental-state talk in reminiscing are
regressed on children’s “I did it” source errors
Variable
B
SE B
β
Constant
.296
.120
Mother MST Rem
-.064
.341
-.034
Child MST Rem
.194
.278
.127
Note. MST = mental-state talk. Rem = Reminiscing.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

R²

.016

Table F4
Regression in which total mental-state talk in reminiscing (mother and child combined) are
regressed on children’s “I did it” source errors
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Variable
B
SE B
β
Constant
.276
.140
Total MST Rem
.167
.508
.059
Note. MST = mental-state talk. Rem = Reminiscing.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

R²
.003

Table F5
Regression in which total mental-state talk in storytelling (mother and child combined) are
regressed on children’s source accuracy
Variable
B
Constant
.562
Total MST Story
.334
Note. MST = mental-state talk.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

SE B
.070
.365

β

R²

.162

.026

Table F6
Regression in which mother mental-state talk and child mental-state talk in storytelling are
regressed on children’s source accuracy
Variable
B
Constant
.572
Mother MST Story
.358
Child MST Story
-.069
Note. MST = mental-state talk.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

SE B
.071
.360
.118

β

R²

.178
-.106

.040

Table F7
Regression in which mother mental-state talk and child mental-state talk in storytelling are
regressed on children’s “I did it” source errors
Variable
B
Constant
.268
Mother MST Story
.160
Child MST Story
.126
Note. MST = mental-state talk.
* p <.05, **p <.01.
Table F8

SE B
.107
.545
.178

β

R²

.053
.128

.020
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Regression in which mother mental-state talk and child mental-state talk in storytelling are
regressed on children’s “You did it” source errors
Variable
B
Constant
.550
Mother MST Story
-.925
Child MST Story
4.091E-5
Note. MST = mental-state talk.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

SE B
.135
.689
.225

β

R²

-.239
.000

.057

Table F9
Regression in which total mental-state talk in storytelling (mother and child combined) are
regressed on children’s “I did it” source errors
Variable
B
Constant
.274
Total MST Story
.257
Note. MST = mental-state talk.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

SE B
.106
.552

β

R²

.084

.007

Table F10
Regression in which total mental-state talk in storytelling (mother and child combined) are
regressed on children’s “You did it” source errors
Variable
B
Constant
.568
Total MST Story
-1.007
Note. MST = mental-state talk.
* p <.05, **p <.01.

SE B
.133
.690

β

R²

-.254

.064
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